On Thursday February 27, Abdullah Öcalan, founder and (imprisoned) leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), called on his party-movement to declare a ceasefire with the Turkish state and then disband. Öcalan’s announcement, the fruit of weeks of negotiations conducted in secret with representatives from Ankara, opens the door to a new peace process, but to a great deal of uncertainty as well.
Mathilde Thon-Fourcade spoke to Iris Lambert to take stock of the situation.
Colin Powers took care of the translation of this interview.
What influence does Abdullah Öcalan actually retain?
Since the PKK’s establishment as a political party in 1978 (and across its subsequent evolution into an armed movement), it has known one leader: Abdullah Öcalan. Founder, ideologue, and senior decision-maker, Öcalan has embodied the Kurdish liberation movement itself. For the fighters, he is the struggle incarnate. His words echo as those of a prophet.
Prior to his imprisonment on the Turkish island of İmralı in 1999, Öcalan often personally handled the teaching of ideology within PKK training camps. This was so during the party-movement’s time in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley, during their decamping for Syria, and during their residence in the mountains of northern Iraq. Aspiring guerrillas were subjected to Öcalan’s “Analyses” (Çözümlemeler) for long hours–some testimonies speak of speeches lasting up to 9 hours, during which orator and audience had to stand. The focus of these sessions ranged between military and political struggle. One recurring lesson was that emancipation could only be realized through spirit and arms.1 Over time, Öcalan’s teachings would be recorded and distributed through audio cassettes and books. Despite a now twenty-six year stay in prison, Öcalan’s words and story remain core to the socialization of PKK militants. For the movement’s activists and constituencies, Öcalan’s figure continues to represent the archetypal “New Man”. Things as basic as behavioral customs and rules–like the ban on crossing one’s legs–derive from Öcalan’s example and instruction. Instantiating what it is to be free from Turkish control and traditional (capitalist and patriarchal) social structure, “Uncle”, as he is affectionately referred, stands as model and guiding light.2
Recent developments, including, of course his abduction by Turkish intelligence in 1999 and subjection to solitary confinement starting in March 2020, have lessened Öcalan’s political gravity to a degree. Dynamics of internal competition between the different branches of the PKK contribute to this as well. Nevertheless, Öcalan remains the lodestar for the PKK itself and for many beyond. A number of Kurdish organizations, in fact–some armed, others political and civil–ground themselves in Öcalan’s ideological tenets and position him as their intellectual and/or political leader. The Kongra Star in Syria, a confederation of activist groups working specifically on gender equality issues, are one such example. Though they have no direct organizational link with the PKK, they have sworn allegiance to the struggle led by Abdullah Ocalan.
In light of the communication breakdown between Abdullah Öcalan and the PKK headquarters in the mountains of Iraqi Kurdistan (which commenced upon the former being condemned to solitary confinement in 2020), it was reasonable to wonder how Öcalan’s ceasefire declaration might be received. The initial official response from PKK headquarters, published March 1, indicated respect while leaving ambiguous whether the movement would follow its leader’s wishes to a tee. While repeatedly called “Leader Apo” (i.e. Uncle), the statement asserted that Öcalan’s release was still a prerequisite for beginning peace negotiations proper.
Lineage of Öcalan’s pivot
For Öcalan and the PKK, this is hardly the first flirtation with laying down arms. The organization’s first (unilateral) ceasefire declaration was actually made in 1993; Öcalan’s intervention in February takes the total number of ceasefire declarations up to nine. In many instances, moreover, these moves have been part of a larger attempt at demilitarizing the conflict. Two months after being sentenced to death by a State Security Court in June 1999, Öcalan had, through his lawyers, publicly called on PKK troops to withdraw from Turkey and abandon armed struggle altogether. Soon thereafter, his appeal against violence was anchored to a significant shift in political objective: Where once drawing the horizon at an independent or autonomous Kurdistan, Öcalan reset the target as the establishment of a truly democratic Turkey.3 The wider PKK signed off on the change of direction at the meeting of its 7th congress in northern Iraq. Arms were only taken up again in 2004–with the endorsement of Öcalan himself, it should be said–because Kurds in Turkey were unceasingly repressed in the intervening period.4 The PKK also engaged in a peace process in 2013 though this attempt at bringing the struggle to a conclusion fizzled out in 2015. Regardless, these initiatives, even in failure, showed the PKK would give up armed struggle if material and political conditions dictated it.5 What surprised some militants last month, then, was less that Öcalan might consider participating in another peace process, but that he would call for the disbandment of the PKK itself prior to doing so.6
If grounded in this history, Öcalan’s declaration on February 27 was also prompted by a series of more contingent developments. Specifically, it is the product of months-long secret negotiations. In hindsight, the first sign that something was afoot came in October 2024, when Turkish far-right leader Delvet Bahçeli, head of the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) and an ally of President Erdoğan, proposed that Öcalan give a speech to the Assembly before the parliamentary bloc of the pro-Kurdish People’s Equality and Democracy (DEM) party. At the time, Erdoğan hailed Bahçeli’s plan as the opening of a “window of opportunity” for the advent of a Turkey “free of terrorism”. Though neither Bahçeli nor Erdoğan pointed to a larger peace process–and though neither mentioned that the idea of a speech at the Assembly had been run past Öcalan himself–this bold proposal hinted that a gambit was underway.
The (indirect) overture from Erdoğan is a function of shifting political incentives and ruptures within the regional environment. Concerning the former, the Turkish President knows he needs to secure the support of the Kurdish population–which represents 15-20% of the electorate in Turkey–to enact the constitutional reforms which would allow him to again stand for elections in 2028. Concerning the latter, the fall of the Baathist regime in Syria is especially critical. With Assad’s departure for Russia, Kurdish forces in the northeast found themselves in a precarious position, all the more so with Ankara-friendlies taking the helm of power in Damascus. Erdoğan recognized their precarity as presenting an opportunity for reaching a settlement that might bring greater stability to Turkey’s southern border.
How have the PKK’s modes of action evolved in recent years?
The PKK’s repertoire of action has never been fixed: It has always adapted to the strategic environment, with tactics mediated by political and to a lesser extent moral considerations. In the 1990s, the organization made the weighty decision to deploy suicide bombings, with women typically leading the operation.7 (Previously, the PKK had relied on conventional uses of explosives). The decision had an effect lasting through the present day. On October 1 of last year, a commando from the PKK’s “Immortals Battalion” carried out a suicide operation against the headquarters of the Turkish Defense Industries in Ankara. In addition to the woman who detonated the bomb, five were killed and twenty-two wounded.
Geographically, the majority of the PKK’s armed operations take place in the Iraqi theater. Most concentrate in the Matine and Gara mountains of northern Iraqi Kurdistan. Predominantly ground assaults, they target the Turkish troops who have been deployed in the area for many years. Since 2022, Turkey’s military has been engaged in an offense against PKK militants there as part of the “Claw-Lock” operation. The broader objective of the operation is to establish a “security corridor” on the Turkish-Iraqi border with the ultimate goal of building a “development route” linking the Iraqi port of Basra with Turkey (and then Europe). Toward this end, Ankara had also emphasized rapprochement with Baghdad. Last spring, this resulted in Iraq’s government listing the PKK as a “banned” group. While not the designation (read: terrorist group) that Ankara hoped for, it was a step in the right direction.
In fighting the PKK, Turkey’s technological superiority has always been a major source of advantage. In recent times, Ankara’s know-how in the production and deployment of reconnaissance and combat drones (notably the Bayraktar TB2) has proven particularly influential. Coupled with the use of air bombers, these drones have allowed Turkey’s military to vastly restrict the movements of PKK militants. (Note that the pursuit of the PKK has also caused forced displacements and resulted in civilian casualties.) Aiding the PKK as it navigates this military environment is the organization’s unmatched knowledge of the local topography. The group has, after all, occupied the mountains in question since the 1980s. If a spring 2024 announcement is anything to go by, the group may be building up defensive capacities for dealing with Turkish drones as well: According to the PKK, it now possesses ground-to-air weapons capable of shooting down Turkish drones.
In addition to military operations, the PKK’s repertoire of action contains a host of non-violent maneuvers: Political, artistic and cultural activism have been central to the group’s mode of struggle for the better part of fifty years. Recently, a number of new groups have sprung up to promote Abdullah Öcalan’s ideology and his model of “democratic confederalism” through civil means. These organizations have often been banned and criminalized. This is so even in Iraqi Kurdistan, where the Kurdistan Society Freedom Movement (Tevgera Azadî) recently had to cease its activities (August 2024) following a decision by the Supreme Judicial Council of Iraq.
Could Öcalan’s announcements have an impact on other pro-Kurdish armed parties in the region?
Put most simply, it depends on the armed party in question.
In the first communiqué issued following Öcalan’s declaration, the Executive Committee of the PKK asserted the following: “We declare an effective ceasefire as of today. None of our forces will take armed action unless attacked”. The following day, the PKK’s armed wing, the People’s Defense Forces (HPG), issued a second declaration specifying that the ceasefire applied not only to its “main forces in Turkey” but also to “all structures, as well as special fedai teams [suicide squads], YPS [civil defense units], MAK [Aziz Güler Martyr Units] and other self-defense units”. All the units named fall under the direct command of the PKK’s armed wing. All units not named–regardless of their level of affiliation with the PKK–are not subject to the HPG’s decision. Syria’s armed Kurdish groups–specifically, the YPG and YPJ, which together help form the spine of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)–made this expressly clear. Despite being denigrated as PKK proxies by Ankara, both disseminated public statements in the aftermath of Öcalan’s declaration specifying that his decision was not binding upon them.8
In Iraq, the organization to watch is the Sinjar Resistance Units (YBS). The group formed after the start of the Sinjar battle in 2014, following Da’esh’s massacres of Yezidi communities. At that time, YBS received significant support from both the PKK and the YPG, both in the form of training or materiel. As the fight with Da’esh escalated, the YBS was integrated into Hachd Chaabi, the (Shiiite majority) coalition of paramilitary groups which waged the war on behalf of the Iraqi state. Once Da’esh was defeated, the organization’s relation with the Hachd and Iraqi state loosened. At the time of speaking, YBS is yet to publicly respond to Öcalan’s declaration. Local sources, however, report that the organization has no intention of putting down its arms.
As for Iran, the picture is a bit muddled with the Iranian-Kurdish Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK)9. Party leadership, based in the same mountains of northern Iraq as the PKK, did issue a statement in support of Öcalan’s appeal. They did not, however, clarify what, exactly, they supported (i.e. ceasefire, disarmament,or disbandment).
Wither the PKK?
It would be premature to make any firm statement on the PKK’s future. In the first instance, we must await the determinations of a PKK congress. Per Öcalan’s declaration, it is only by the congress’ democratic decision that the question of dissolution can be decided. At this stage, it is difficult to predict which way the congress might turn. It is even more difficult, however, to imagine a congress actually being convened: Given the security situation and the manner with which the Turkish military hunts PKK militants, it beggars belief that a congress could be held any time soon.
Furthermore, it is important to recall that while endorsing Öcalan’s statement, the PKK has retained the right to continue defensive operations. In a sense, this leaves the PKK’s future in Ankara’s hands. Insofar as Ankara has yet to comment on the prospects of a ceasefire; insofar as Ankara’s official position is that the PKK must immediately and unconditionally dissolve prior to peace talks commencing; and insofar as the Turkish military did attack PKK outposts but a few hours after Öcalan’s statement, it is easy to imagine this whole thing running into an impasse in short order. For its part, the PKK has asserted two preconditions for disarmament: that “democratic policies and legal bases” be guaranteed in Turkey and that Öcalan be released. Talks currently underway in Ankara are alleged to center upon improvements to Öcalan’s detention conditions, the release of political prisoners, a possible amnesty for PKK fighters and asylum in Iraqi Kurdistan for the group’s cadres.10
PKK militants have often described their organization as a “living organism”, one that will adapt to survive in any environment.11 Regardless of circumstance, this constitutive nature means the group is unlikely to disappear from the scene altogether. The course of negotiations may well lead to disarmament. But then, war has always been politics by other means.
Notes
1Özcan, Ali K. (2006) Turkey’s Kurds. A Theoritical Analysis of the PKK and Abdullah Öcalan, New York, Routledge.
DOI : 10.1163/22112987-12340004
2 Grojean, O. (2008) « La production de l’Homme nouveau au sein du PKK », European Journal of Turkish Studies [en ligne], 8 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/ejts.2753
3 Marcus, Aliza (2007) Blood and Belief. The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independance, New York et Londres, New York University Press.
DOI : 10.18574/nyu/9780814759561.001.0001
4 Ibid.
5 This is essentially what Öcalan underlined in his February 27 address. He states that “the closure of democratic channels has played a role in the PKK, the oldest and most extensive armed uprising in the history of the [Turkish] Republic, finding a social base and support”, before adding: “The appeal launched by Devlet Bahçeli, together with the willingness expressed by Mr. President and the positive responses of the other political parties to this appeal, have created an environment in which I launch an appeal to lay down arms, for which I assume historical responsibility.”
6 For example, in the northern Iraqi town of Silêmanî (or Souleymanieh), where the PKK has long had a foothold (particularly after 2014 and the battles against the Islamic State), PKK supporters gathered for the occasion in front of a giant screen exchanged bewildered glances at the announcement. All feared a resurgence of violence from Turkey, which has been conducting a large-scale offensive against PKK positions in the region since 2022
7 Altinay, E. (2013). « ‘The Terrorists with Highlights’: Kurdish Female Suicide Bombers in Mainstream Turkish Media », in: Attwood, F., Campbell, V., Hunter, I.Q., Lockyer, S. (dir.) Controversial Images. Media Representations on the Edge, Palgrave Macmillan, Londres.
8 Per commander Mazloum Abdi “Öcalan’s message concerns the PKK and has nothing to do with us in Syria”.
9 The PJAK, created in the spring of 2004, forms part, along with the PKK, of a broader structure called the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK), which brings together all the social, military, political and associative parties that lay claim to Abdullah Öcalan’s doctrine.
10 Zaman A. (février 2025) End of an era? PKK leader Ocalan orders militants to end war with Turkey, ‘dissolve’, Al Monitor, accessible : https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2025/02/end-era-pkk-leader-ocalan-orders-militants-end-war-turkey-dissolve
11 Interviews conducted by the author with PKK members, spring 2024.
Of course, the thought is not their own but Öcalan’s: “The tactical leadership must be able to switch from one form of organization and action to another as the situation demands…If necessary, it must develop new forms with sufficient speed”, the PKK founder wrote in his prison notebooks. See: Öcalan, A. (2020) La révolution communaliste : écrits de prison. Paris : Libertalia.