Picture above by Jules Regnier (April 2022)
The environmental crisis is becoming an urgent and distressing phenomenon worldwide. But concerns run particularly high in the Levant (bilad as-Sham) region. Hotter and drier conditions with extensive droughts might severely affect already scarce water resources, and jeopardize harvests and the livelihoods of agricultural producers in the region. However, water supply and agriculture are not the only concern: decreased rainfall, reduced vegetal soil cover and land degradation are increasing the frequency and intensity of sandstorms. Water scarcity and desertification are mutually reinforcing phenomena, that also contribute to the impoverishment of soil and decreasing fertility.
Agriculture is central to this matter. It is at the crossroad between soil, water and human activity, and is fundamental to the perpetuation of the latter. Over the past decades, the pressure of the expanding free market has transformed agriculture all over the world, pushing forward intensive and unsustainable practices that have become the norm today. Thus, agriculture has become one of the most environmentally destructive economic sectors, owing to the widespread surfaces it affects, the massive use of chemical inputs that pollute soil and water, and the systematic use of ploughing that has dramatically accelerated soil degradation. In the countries of the periphery1, the switch towards a commercial and intensive agricultural system has been sustained by imperialist and colonial relations. These have perpetrated dynamics of domination while feeding material and financial dependency.
If agriculture is often portrayed as a major pollutant, it is also central to several major contemporary issues such as ensuring food security and providing sources of income to vulnerable populations. The solutions promoted by international institutions today, and endorsed by national governments, are inscribed in the continuation of the commercial understanding of agriculture and want to conciliate the free-market economy and profitability, while building resilience to climate change. When analysed in depth, these dimensions hardly seem compatible, and the commodification of vital resources such as water, land and food present major environmental and social risks that are aggravated by the environmental crisis. These risks, as well as the vulnerability associated with famine and food insecurity, does not concern everyone to the same degree: poorer classes are systematically more affected by external shocks.
Jordan is often considered as an extreme case of a water scarce country2. Agriculture, that represents 50% of the national water consumption, is often pointed at, accused of not generating enough economic growth. However, the existing relations between economics, agriculture, and environmental degradation or preservation, are more complex than they are usually portrayed. The geopolitical strategic position of the Monarchy, and its great economic and political dependency, make the issue even more convoluted. The rentier essence of Jordan’s economy3, specific processes of capital accumulation and the existence of a transnational economic elite, lay the basis for the specificities of Jordan’s capitalist model. In this context, the process of economic liberalisation that the country initiated in the second half of the 80s changed the functioning of the economy. If it did not succeed in diversifying it, in expanding productive sectors or in restructuring Jordan’s debt, it did however degrade work conditions and the overall quality of life4.
Jordan’s agricultural development is embedded in this inherently imperialist system, drawing on Rosa Luxembourg’s vision of imperialism as the expansion of the capitalist system to the countries of the periphery which entails exploitative relations. International aid and the material dependency that characterise the Monarchy still have a considerable effect on national politics and create a state of limited political sovereignty and permeability between national and foreign agendas5. The persistence of authoritarianism has itself been associated with aid and international, and specifically US, influence in Jordan6. Imperialism in Jordan therefore stems out of several layers: foreign influence and presence are still very much relevant and are embedded in both economic liberalisation and the persistent stability of the regime; the partial economic liberalisation has concentrated accumulation of capital towards the upper classes close to the regime through different mechanisms7. As a consequence of these processes, the majority of Jordan’s population has followed a trend characteristic of the Arab world: the ongoing degradation of the living conditions8 of the majority of the population is accompanied by the general degradation of the environment (and therefore health and living conditions) and the rapid depletion of resources. The particularity of the form of capitalism that stemmed out of Jordan’s role in global imperialism, is that economic crises are ingrained in the normal functioning of the regime9.
The observation of rural dynamics allows a unique window of understanding of the causalities between global economics, food security and environmental degradation. How did the extension of capitalist dynamics and the increasing integration of Jordan in the world market affect agriculture, its relation to the environment and changed access to land and water? I am not going to answer this question in absolute terms, but rather through the study of the expansion of date palm trees in the central part of the Jordan Valley. The case of the Medjool palm trees10 in the Jordan Valley gives an example of the ecological and social complexity that underlies specific agricultural systems that are often addressed in both national and international politics as purely technocratic issues.
1 – Observing palm trees: the social fabric of Medjool producers
Looking at his farm from the heights that dominate the Karameh area, Ahmad11 explains how Medjool trees were imported from Morocco by the Americans. The name itself is the result of a misunderstanding between the Westerners and the local people: when asked for the name of this type of date, locals would have answered that it’s “not known”, adjective that foreigners understood as being the name of the variety. After the variety was adopted by Israelis and cultivated on the occupied side of the Jordan Valley, Palestinian investors like his family took up this type of crop. Originally from Betlehem, Ahmad’s father started the farm in the mid-70s as a hobby, investing capital originated by his main activity in the real estate sector. Today the farm in Karameh has become the main source of income of the family. They export dates to North America, Europe, India, and several countries from the region, notably to the Gulf. The dates are sorted by size with a machine. Ahmad claims to be the first one to have used an AI system to sort out the date more accurately.
The sorting process is essentially associated with the packaging of the dates: the dried fruits need to be sorted out by size and colour to obtain boxes with homogenous products. The farm has its packaging facility and their own professional branding. Not all date producers can afford to have their packaging and storing facilities. The production of Medjool dates is costly: the trees only produce a profitable harvest seven years after plantation. Moreover, the pollination, the drying process and the harvest require a specialised labour, which increases costs compared to other palm trees. Sorting out the dates and the packaging process are also expensive, but the cost can be reduced by using seasonal employees, generally women from the area, that constitute very inexpensive labour. However, the most important cost stems from the storage: in order to be preserved, these dates need to be stored at -18°. Producers that can afford a cold chamber and the electricity required, can store the dates up to one year, and wait for the price on the international market to increase to sell them.
Smaller investors that can’t afford the storage and packaging infrastructure have to rely on bigger structures for these operations. Without the storage facility, they have no choice but to sell right after the harvest at the price that they are offered. It’s the case of Abu Haifa, who started his farm ten years ago. Since he invested in Medjool dates, Abu Haifa lost money year after year to keep the farm going. Like most investors in this sector, he started the farm as a secondary activity, using the capital from his main work as the owner of several private schools in Amman. The availability of money from other activities allows these investors not to go into debts in order to finance the farm in the first years.
Speaking to an intermediary, who buys and plants Medjool dates for new investors, he explains that it’s not simply a matter of profit. Small farms, below 40 donums (4 hectares), are not big to turn a profit. The cultivation of Medjool trees is also a matter of showing privileged. The entire sector consists of wealthy investors that can afford taking an expensive risk. In the absence of subsidies and financial support, the substantial costs associated with Medjool trees makes them inaccessible to the great majority of farmers.
In the past years, the sector has been presented as the driving force of Jordanian agriculture. The government and international organisations alike have identified Medjool as the product of excellence of Jordanian exports. Most recently, a special section was created in the National Centre for Agricultural Research (NARC) to cover issues linked to the production of Medjool dates, and in 2020 the Ministry of Agriculture launched a policy strategy specific to the sector12. International Organisations like the World Bank (WB) also promote this type of production as an investment opportunity to encourage a transition to a more resilient agricultural system13.
As a high added value and export crop, these dates seem ideal to reconcile profitability and environmental concerns: these resilient trees can endure high temperatures, do not need much water when compared to other crops, and still produce when irrigated with saline and degraded water. Nevertheless, the historical evolution of Jordanian agricultural development, of which the specialisation in Medjool dates is a continuation, is useful to understand the whys and wherefores of contemporary issues.
2 – Foreign influence and agricultural transformation
Medjool production is inscribed in a type of agricultural development oriented towards ever greater commercialisation, specialisation and exports. This approach to agricultural development finds its roots in policies promoted through international and humanitarian aid since the 50s, that were strongly State-driven. The 80s and the 90s began a new phase of market driven agricultural development, marked by economic liberalisation and the drastic reduction of state support and regulation from the sector. Agricultural development, growing export-oriented commercialisation and the expansion of the market in the countries of the periphery of the world is deeply intertwined with imperialist dynamics that perpetuate schemes of dependency and subordination, and has harmed the peasantry, contributing to uncontrolled urbanisation and environmental degradation. Both these conceptions of agricultural modernity transformed the way agriculture interacted with its environment, and the social fabric at the core of agricultural production.
After its independence from England, achieved in 1946, Jordan inherited a structural economic dependency from foreign aid that pushed several academics to define this model as ‘semi’ or ‘indirect’ rentierism14. The Hashemite Kingdom kept drawing international aid because of its very peculiar geostrategic position in the region15. The creation of the state of Israel, the waves of Palestinian refugees forced to leave their homes and the emergent global politics of the Cold War, pushed American aid to replace the British, perpetuating dependency and shaping the agricultural system. The Jordan Valley plays a particular role here because of its nature of borderland: agricultural development was seen as a way of integrating Palestinians who had been forcibly uprooted from their land, and laid the basis for the strong American involvement in the development of the valley. The “new” Jordan Valley was shaped following the example of the Tennessee Valley16, and the American vision of agricultural development was implemented by a strong national state, that centralised the management of common resources (and most notably water) and offered incentives to adopt the technologies of the green revolution17.
The dominant agricultural system gradually changed from a subsistence model, based on polyculture and mostly relying on rain and surface water, to a commercial intensive model, based on monoculture and cash crops18. These major transformations increased Jordan’s dependency in several ways: on the one hand, agricultural producers became dependent on the outside for agricultural inputs; on the other hand, Jordan agriculture shifted towards exports instead of the satisfaction of national demand. The extremely low prices on the international market for certain varieties of basic food stuff like wheat, corn and rice, reduced the profitability of subsistence agriculture. Jordan, that had been a major regional exporter of durum wheat since the 19th century, became a net importer in a few decades, and depends today almost entirely on the outside for its needs19. Today, Jordan counts amongst the most food dependent countries in the world, importing between 80 and 90% of its national consumption20.
The end of the Cold War, and the years of the Washington consensus21, spread a new vision of market driven agricultural development. The advocacy for little or no state support and a radically open market, with no control over food prices, have affected the livelihoods of farmers, and have increased pressure on the resources and over the environment as a whole. Jordan’s economic liberalisation started towards the end of the 80s and the beginning of the 90s, but accelerated with the succession of Abdallah II to the throne in 1999, and with the Monarchy’s commitment to joining the World Trade Organisation (WTO).
Interestingly the liberalisation of the agricultural sector, promoted in countries of the periphery by institutions largely shaped and financed by countries of the core – such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank – is radically different from the policies implemented in the countries of the core. Agriculture in Europe and in the US alike is heavily subsidised and protected by the State. The great dependency that characterises food and agricultural systems in the Arab world, and more specifically in Jordan, makes these countries extremely vulnerable to the volatility of food prices on the international market22.
Understanding these major changes in agricultural development is fundamental to grasp the origins of many environmental and food issues that Jordan is facing today, that might get considerably worst with climate change and that greatly contribute to environmental degradation. Essentially oriented towards export, Medjool dates reinforce this logic: sustaining dependency from food imports, the national production is oriented towards the satisfaction of the international market.
3 – Are food security and food dependency compatible?
The transformation of Jordan’s agricultural model has changed Jordan’s food-supply and food security model, drastically increasing food dependency over only a few decades. The food security strategy that Jordan has been implementing is similar to many other countries in the region, that is regarded as one of the most food dependent in the world23. To ensure food security while being dependent on imports, a country needs to dispose of enough reserves of hard currency to finance imports (reserves that can typically be retrieved through a certain level of exports). From this perspective, the export of Medjool trees contributes to an increased food security by securing a certain flow of hard currency. Pushing this logic even further, today Jordan aims at becoming a food and agricultural hub for the region24. This strategy aims at creating a favourable environment for goods and capital to flow through the country through ever-greater economic liberalisation and the maximisation of direct foreign and capital-intensive investments.
To manage these levels of food dependency, food subsidies are an essential tool. In case of high inflation caused by the volatility of food prices on the international market, subsidies on basic food stuff allow the governments to avoid transferring inflation to consumers. In fact, food security in not about importing or producing enough food for the population, but mostly about the capacity of the population to afford food, or of the government to keep the prices down. Therefore, events of massive inflation of the prices of basic food staple like the 2007-2008 food crisis, had heavy consequences on government expenditure. Several scholars also associate the steep increase in prices with the beginning of the Arab spring a few years later25. In Jordan, the attempts of the government to lift the subsidy on bread to comply with the conditionalities of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), have historically triggered popular uprising26. The capacity of exports in maintaining the viability of such a precarious food system can however reasonably be questioned. The quest for a greater self-sufficiency, that Gulf countries have been carrying since the early 2000, is a symptom of the fragility of a food system depending on the outside.
Dependency on food imports has also been justified with environmental arguments: water scarcity has been used as an argument to justify a greater dependency on food imports. During the liberal wave that swept over the 90s, the concept of “virtual water”27 became popular amongst policy makers. The concept is an extension of the liberal theory of the comparative advantages and was used to argue that countries of the region should rely on food imports instead of producing food themselves, thus “virtually” importing water. This logic emerged during the mid-90s, years of the peace process between Israel and Palestine and Israel and Jordan, when American diplomats spread the belief that underlying power structures could be overlooked, and the promotion of economic development and cooperation would solve all other issues. Moreover, virtual water promotes an extremely limited understanding of water, obscuring the manifold nature of water as a resource. The concept was used to portray smallholders as ‘inefficient’ users, while capital intensive and industrial agricultural operations were legitimised28.
Nevertheless, the reliance on food imports never translated in more rational water consumption. The constant deficit of the trade balance and the greater profitability of prices on the international market, push policy makers and agricultural producers to orient their production towards exports, virtually “exporting” water. Moreover, commercial export-oriented agriculture has led to the drastic increase of irrigated surfaces, causing a disproportionate use of groundwater and the expansion to the agricultural frontier to more and more desert areas29.
In this context, Medjool dates can be seen as the perfect solution to Jordan’s agricultural and economic challenges. They are export-oriented and very profitable products, that can contribute to the national growth and to reduce the trade deficit, while providing hard currency to finance imports. Moreover, they do not need great quantities of water and can tolerate degraded and saline water. For these reasons, they have been presented as an environmentally sustainable solution for Jordanian agriculture that is simultaneously compatible with the neoliberal vision of the agricultural sector.
In the next section, I will show that this vision of economics, of agriculture and of environmental sustainability is deceiving, and tends to hide and minimize environmental and food security challenges that Jordan might face in the near future. By supporting economic premises that put the profitability and the market at the centre of policy making, the encouragement of the production of Medjool dates hides the grounds for an environmental and social catastrophe.
4 – Social and environmental impacts of a free-market agricultural economy
Despite claims of reducing hardship and creating profit opportunities for farmers, we have seen in the first section of this paper that the conversion to Medjool dates is not accessible to everyone. Because of the high initial investment involved, the sector is dominated by a class of wealthy entrepreneurs, who buy the land – contrary to vegetables producers who rent or use forms of land sharecropping – and invest capital accruing from other activities to finance the date farms. Moreover, the compliances with quality certifications such as – HACCAP and GAP certificates – is a central asset to prove the quality of the dates and export on the international market, particularly after an “outbreak”30 of hepatitis in Australia was linked to the consumption of Jordanian dates. Because of different practices and quality standards, not all producers stand on the same ground: bigger producers, who claim being more professional and experienced, scorn smaller or amateur producers, who “ruin the sector” and “Jordan’s name abroad”31.
Even within this class of investors the nature of Jordanian capitalism in the agricultural sector seems to increase the vulnerability of small and medium producers, by leaving the determination of price to the whim of bigger facilities. Because of their social status, and contrary to farmers in most other sectors, palm trees producers are able to organise themselves in associations and cooperatives. Some of these have a real power on governmental institutions: for example, the biggest and oldest association of producers, the Jordan Dates Association (JODA), that brings together 32 farms, is one of the partners of the Ministry of Agriculture in the implementation of the development strategy for Medjool dates.
The spread of this crop entails an ongoing transformation in land and water tenure32. The expansion of Medjool palm trees in the central Jordan Valley allows a specific social class of producers to access resources and appropriate land, while creating a niche of capital accumulation for a narrow minority of investors who benefit from government support. In the Jordanian case, a class analysis allows to put forward that the access to resources has changed, as investors buy land that was previously exploited by smaller farmers and sharecroppers.
The sector is also very limited in terms of job creation. As in most agricultural activities, work is seasonal and precarious. Agriculture is one of the two economic sectors in which labour is not regulated, and workers have no access to social benefits. The number of work opportunities provided is in itself questionable: if advocates of palm trees praise the amount of employment created by the sector, in relative terms, and when compared to the employment of previous agricultural model that were more labour intensive, the expansion of date trees might actually reduce work opportunities. Analysing the Palestinian side of the Jordan Valley, Trottier et al. (2019) demonstrate that livelihoods associated with more permanent activities such as sharecropping have been compromised by the expansion of Medjool dates. Moreover, many producers boast the job opportunities they create for local women native of the valley, appropriating the vocabulary of international and non-governmental organisations around women empowerment through employment. Employing women is however a way of paying the employees even less than their male counterparts, for seasonal jobs paid on a daily basis, without granting any social security right. This type of employment is also based on the prejudice that women “have a better eye”33 to sort dates out, as women employees are exclusively limited to the selection and classification of ripe fruits.
The environmental sustainability of this type of production is also dubious. It is inscribed in a vision that conceives the environment and resources as tradable, and where the preservation of the status quo (and more specifically current patterns of capital accumulation) is more important than to implement long term strategies to ensure the survival of the species (the human species).
Despite Medjool trees being drought and salinity tolerant, the market imperatives do not encourage producers to spare water. Most farms in the Jordan Valley are supplied water through the King Abdallah Canal (KAC), that carries water from the northern part of the valley to the south. However, Abu Osama points out that the water tours from the canal are not always sufficient. As bigger sizes are most valued on the international market, the quantities of water distributed do not always allow producers to reach the desired date size. Abu Osama’s farm is based in an area where underground water is very saline, and he has no other solution but to settle for the amount of water provided by the canal. Other farms however compensate for the deficiency of the KAC water with legal or illegal wells that allow them to exploit extra groundwater.
The tolerance to salinity is also a characteristic that needs to be nuanced in its benefits in terms of environmental preservation. The harvests are not dramatically affected when irrigated with either saline groundwater or a relatively saline mix of fresh water and treated wastewater carried by the KAC. However, the salt in the water cumulates in the soil. The only way to reduce the salinity of the soil is through rainwater or irrigation with non-saline water. In a context of decreasing precipitations, the soil will reach levels of salinity that will eventually make any type of agriculture difficult, if not impossible. Fostering the illusion of creating greater resilience to climate change for Jordanian agriculture while remaining profitable in free market economy, the current political vision around Medjool trees only delays the need for a medium and long-term radical solution.
This vision is unpinned by a narrow understanding of environmental degradation and possible solutions. The focus on climate change is in itself an issue, as it presupposes that the only aim is the reduction of carbon emissions. Therefore, soil degradation, desertification, loss of fertility and of biodiversity, the intensification of floodings and many other aspects of the environmental crisis that we are experiencing are not addressed.
Palm trees are compatible with the practices proposed by regenerative agriculture and agroecology, that formulate food systems that are productive, but also foster the restoration of ecosystems. In older agricultural systems like the oasis agriculture in Tunisia, palm trees were used to create the higher floor of vegetation, which was essential in creating a microclimate and shade for other cultivations to prosper. The shade and the protection from the wind allowed a lower evaporation of water, while the multiple layers of vegetation hosted a great variety of fauna. The increased biodiversity reduced the occurrence of pests and illnesses because of the presence of predators, while providing the soil with organic material for the plants to feed on. Nowadays these practices have been rehabilitated by environmentalists and alternative farmers, and have even been taken on by international organisations like the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) and by many development agencies. However, these forms of agricultural production that are labour intensive, are hardly compatible with a free-market economy where producers are constantly competing to lower the cost of production and maximise profitability. The development of the Medjool production, as well as the technical fixes that are vastly promoted by national and international institutions as a solution to climate change, comply with the current form of imperialist and capitalist relations. These solutions feed into this economic system without imposing any radical change, and keep feeding systems of capital accumulation both at the national and international levels. Medjool trees create niches of capital accumulation at the national level for a small class of investors, while feeding the global market with exotic fruits for well-off consumers. By bolstering the illusion that commercial drought resistant trees are enough to counter the environmental crisis, they foster the idea that there’s no need for radically changing the way in which economics interacts with the environment.
I have shown how the expansion of Medjool production is a symptom of the expansion of imperialist dynamics in Jordanian agriculture. Their rapid expansion is mostly profit-driven, restructures the sector in a way that disfavours more traditional and permanent agricultural practices, and allows a wealthier class to appropriate land (and therefore water). The reason why national and international institutions endorse this practice as sustainable, is that it is profitable to a class that is close to the regime’s political spheres, and that the drought tolerance of the trees allows to display a certain attention to the environment and to the conservation of water.
This vision reproduces a form of hegemony that has not fundamentally changed since national independence, and that is still integrated today by the approaches promoted by international and national organisations alike. The centrality of the market and the imperative of economic growth are used to promote a very specific agricultural model, that is extremely detrimental to the ecosystems. The solutions promoted nowadays, despite the well-known state of the environmental emergency, avoid questioning the underlying economic system, and are thus largely insufficient in their impacts. They foster nonetheless the conviction that the free-market approach, dogmatic economic vision that underpins contemporary imperialism, is compatible with finding concrete solutions to the environmental crisis.
The strategy of relying on imports to ensure the country’s food security, makes lower classes, whose food expenses already represent a great percentage of the total household budget, the most vulnerable to the spikes in food prices that are typical of the integrated global economy that underpins the contemporary food-system. The growing unpredictability of climate and the concentration of basic food staples in only a few countries in the world, might exponentially increase the risk of food crises in the future, hazard to which Arab countries are particularly vulnerable.
I tried to show that the form of capitalism that has emerged in Jordan brings about a type of environmental degradation and social dispossession that goes beyond the simple impact of war, and that is entirely normalised by both national and international organisations.
In order to fully account for the current emergencies, a profound change in the economic system is necessary. The embeddedness of our economy in a social and environmental ecosystem needs to be accounted for, to avoid creating a dystopia in which clean water will become the privilege of the few instead of the right of the many. The free-market faith, and the commercialisation of nature that results, need to be deconstructed and questioned in policy making spheres in order to avoid the social and environmental catastrophe that is forthcoming. Particularly in Jordan, access to clean nature, basic resources and healthy food is rapidly becoming the privilege of the few.
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- Throughout the article I use the term “periphery” and “core” rather than terms like Global South or Third world to avoid the implicit derogatory meaning. These terms were initially coined by Samir Amin (1976) to put forward a process of capital accumulation and exploitative relations, that go systematically from the periphery towards the countries of the core. ↩︎
- “Jordan is one of the world’s most water-scarce countries, with as little as 61 m3 of water available per person every year”. “Jordan’s farmers respond to water scarcity woes with innovation”, United Nation in Jordan, June 1, 2023. ↩︎
- The term ‘rentier’ defines economy that are shaped by their dependency on a form of rent, that cans be associated with hydrocarbons, or in Jordan’s case, foreign aid and workers’ remittances. ↩︎
- Labadi, 2019; Powers, 2020. ↩︎
- Knowles, 2005 ↩︎
- Schuetze, 2019; Schwedler, 2022; ↩︎
- Moore, 2009; Powers, 2020. ↩︎
- Ali, 2015 ; Capasso and Ali, 2023. ↩︎
- Powers, 2020. ↩︎
- Even though I will use the term tree to facilitate the reading of the paper, palms are not trees. ↩︎
- All names have been changed. ↩︎
- Mustafa, 2022. ↩︎
- World Bank, 2022. ↩︎
- Knowles, 2005. ↩︎
- Moore, 2009. ↩︎
- Elmusa, 1994. ↩︎
- Ibid. ↩︎
- Agricultural crops that are planted based on the price on the national or export markets. ↩︎
جبريل، دانة. كيف وقفت الأردن عن زراعة القمح عبر 50 سنة. حيبر، كانون الاول 2018. ↩︎
- Hompa, 2014. ↩︎
- The Washington Consensus is a set of ultraliberal economic policies, which lay the base for the reforms encouraged by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to restructure the economies of the indebted countries of the periphery in the second half of the 80s, and that are still implemented today. ↩︎
- Perosino, 2022. ↩︎
- Harrigan, 2014. ↩︎
- El Zoubi and Shuaibi, 2021. ↩︎
- Harrigan, 2014 ↩︎
- Martinez, 2016 ↩︎
- Allan, 1993 ↩︎
- Trottier and Perrier, 2017. ↩︎
- Van Aken et al., 2009; Margane and al Dwairi, 2020. ↩︎
- O’Neill et al., 2022. ↩︎
- Interview with Medjool producer in the Jordan Valley, February 2022 ↩︎
- Trottier et al., 2019. ↩︎
- Interview with Medjool producer in the Jordan Valley, February 2022 ↩︎