About Paul-Crescent Beninga
Paul-Crescent Beninga holds a PhD in Political Science from the Catholic University of Central Africa. He is the Executive Director of the Central African Centre for Geopolitical Research and Analysis and the founding president of the Central African Institute of Social Sciences and Management. His research focuses primarily on armed conflicts and the media landscape.
Discussant
Roland Marchal is a sociologist and researcher at the National Foundation for Political Science, based at the Centre for International Studies (CERI, Sciences Po). In addition to his work on the policies of global powers in Africa, he specialises in armed conflicts and civil wars in sub-Saharan Africa, particularly their relationship to state formation. Grounded in extensive field research, his studies focus on the Horn of Africa, Chad, the Central African Republic, and the Sahel.
This presentation analyses the strategies of mobilisation and opposition surrounding the prospect of a third term for President Faustin-Archange Touadéra in the Central African Republic (CAR). Following the 2013–2016 transition and the adoption of a Constitution limiting the presidency to two terms, the issue of a third term emerged as early as 2020, particularly with the constitutional revision approved by referendum in 2023.
- Political Context and Key Issues
The government justifies the constitutional revision by invoking the need to adapt laws to African realities—an argument previously used in 1958 to replace French legal frameworks with national legislation. However, six decades later, the relevance of this justification is widely debated.
The new Constitution removes term limits, raising a technical and legal debate: does this effectively reset the term count to zero? The opposition rejects this interpretation and seeks to prevent Touadéra’s re-election.
- Mobilisation and Opposition Strategies
a. Government Mobilisation: Between Neopatrimonialism and State Instrumentalisation
Support for Touadéra is largely based on state resources and networks. Ministers and high-ranking officials organise rallies in favour of the president, using public funds and state vehicles. For example, on 5 February 2025, three ministers orchestrated a mobilisation in a Bangui neighbourhood to call for his candidacy, illustrating a top-down rather than spontaneous movement.
Similar actions take place in opposition strongholds, often accompanied by intimidation tactics: citizens critical of the regime receive threats, with perpetrators acting under a sense of impunity due to their ties to the government.
b. Opposition Strategies: Between Dialogue and Disruption
The opposition initially seeks dialogue, as seen in previous electoral crises. However, unlike in the past, the sub-region (Chad, Gabon) remains disengaged from the CAR issue, and the European Union’s initiative via the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue lacks the influence of a regional political mediation.
At the same time, security crises emerge in rural areas, disrupting the electoral process. The government attributes these outbreaks of violence to the opposition, further legitimising its own authority.
- Effects of These Strategies
The opposition struggles to present a coherent political alternative, reinforcing Touadéra’s image as a providential leader. By boycotting the electoral process, it marginalises itself and cedes political ground to the ruling party.
The government exploits this weakness through a scapegoating strategy, accusing the opposition of being responsible for the violence. Lacking clear leadership and organisation, the opposition continues to lose ground.
Conclusion
The case of Touadéra’s third term reflects broader trends across Francophone Africa: state instrumentalisation, a weakened opposition, and the legitimisation of power through an “Africanisation” discourse on legal frameworks. The absence of regional mediation and the opposition’s lack of strategy further reinforce political imbalance, facilitating the consolidation of the incumbent regime