Tunisia held Presidential elections on October 6th<\/sup>, 2024. Unsurprisingly, incumbent President Kais Saied won with 90.69% of the votes cast, ahead of liberal candidate Ayachi Zammel (7.35%) and Arab nationalist Zouhair Maghzaoui (1.97%). The election was marked by low turnout (28.80%) and controversy. The latter stemmed from bans imposed on particular opposition candidates. While Kais Saied’s regime claimed an affirming victory, the opposition framed his win within the context of a rigged electoral process and a political environment hostile to democratic contention. Any discussion of the opposition\u2019s weakness must first consider the conditions under which it operates.<\/p>\n\n\n\n On July 25th<\/sup>, 2021, President Kais Saied activated Article 80 of the Constitution, froze parliament, dismissed the head of government and temporarily <\/em>vested all executive and legislative powers in his own hands. The emergency of the Covid-19 pandemic was used as pretext for these sweeping actions. Two months later, this coup de force turned into a coup d’\u00e9tat proper when Saied formally suspended the Constitution. Thereafter, he ruled by executive decree. And little by little, the institutions put in place after the 2011 revolution to create a democratic political environment were dismantled.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Saied\u2019s power grab culminated in the adoption of a new Constitution in July 2022. Once the constitution was in place, Carthage embarked on a project for (re)consolidating autocracy. Key to this was Decree no.54. Officially aimed at combating false information and cybercrime, the Decree was leveraged to muzzle opposition voices and establish a climate of terror throughout the country.[1]<\/a> Several journalists were arrested under this decree, including Sonia Dahmani, Mourad Zeghidi and Borhene Bsaies.[2]<\/a> On the political front, high-profile leaders of Tunisia\u2019s political parties were arrested, too: Charged with plotting against the state\u2019s security, leaders such as Ghazi Chaouachi (former Secretary General of the Courant D\u00e9mocratique), Issam Chebbi (Secretary General of Al Joumhouri) and other well-known figures were imprisoned across 2023. Most continue to be held in pre-trial detention.[3]<\/a> Though charged with different crimes, prominent figures like Rached Ghannouchi of the Islamist Ennahdha party and Abir Moussi of the Parti Destourien Libre also remain behind bars. None of this would have been possible without Saied\u2019s commandeering of the judiciary. The President\u2019s weaponization of the law began in 2022, when he dissolved the Supreme Council of the Magistracy and dismissed 57 judges.[4]<\/a> With institutional counterweights cleared, he was freed to repress freedoms as he saw fit.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Saied\u2019s actions fundamentally shifted the parameters of political contention after July 25th<\/sup>. In the lead up to last fall\u2019s Presidential elections, his actions also made it incredibly difficult for opposition forces to stage a challenge.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Though the leading parties of the democratic transition announced intentions to boycott the elections from the start, candidates from other political families did attempt to a bid for Carthage. One of the first to enter the race was Lotfi Mraihi. Leader of the Union Populaire R\u00e9publicaine party, Mraihi had been a candidate for the Presidency in 2019, when he garnered nearly 6.56% of the vote. An outspoken critic of the regime, he was arrested in July 2024 and sentenced to eight months in prison on suspicion of corruption.[5]<\/a> Like that, he was disqualified him from running. A similar fate awaited Safi Said, who won 7.4% of the vote in 2019. In June 2024, Said was sentenced to four months’ imprisonment in absentia[6]<\/a> and thereby struck from the ballot. Other candidates were prevented from completing the application process due to the interventions of the Ministry of Interior. One such example was rapper K2Rhym, who was refused his bulletin n\u00b03 (where one reports a possible criminal record).[7]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Even some of the candidates who managed to successfully file their candidacy with the Independent Superior Electoral Body (ISIE) wound up booted from the ballot in the final instance. Prominently, this was the outcome that awaited Mondher Zenaidi, a former minister under Ben Ali; Abdellatif Mekki, a former Minister and Ennahda party member; and Imed Daimi, the former chief of staff for Moncef Marzouki. Each won decisions from the administrative court validating their candidacies. At the end of an unprecedented legal battle, however, the ISIE overruled the court and unilaterally disqualified the three. The ISIE\u2019s actions transgressed electoral law and set a dangerous precedent for the rule of law in Tunisia.[8]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n The voter participation rate in October 2024\u2019s Presidential elections was just 28%. This is in keeping with a post-2011 trend: Abstentionism in Tunisia has risen steadily across the past fourteen years.<\/p>\n\n\n\n At the time of the first free and democratic election in the country’s history (which elected the National Constituent Assembly in 2011), roughly 50% of eligible voters participated. In 2014, the first round of Presidential elections brought just 38% of eligible voters to the ballot box. Five years later, Presidential elections inspired a 50% turnout. In absolute terms, the figures are as follows: 4.3 million voted in 2011, 3.3 million in 2014, 3.4 million in 2019, and just 2.8 million in 2024.<\/p>\n<\/details>\n\n\n\n In view of events over the past four years, to say conditions have been unconducive to opposition activities would risk gross understatement. It is therefore imperative that the opposition\u2019s record post-July 25th<\/sup> first be understood in view of the environment Saied has created.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But it is not Saied\u2019s actions alone that explain the opposition\u2019s weakness. This weakness, observed most recently in failures to politicize an election boycott\u2014a boycott attempted by the mainstream <\/em>opposition (i.e. the leading parties of the democratic transition)\u2014must also be understood in light of the opposition\u2019s inability to connect with popular forces.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Ennahda, arguably the decisive actor during the decade of the democratic transition, has clearly come up short in rebuilding its social sinews. In power throughout the democratic transition (apart from the parenthesis of 2014, when a technocratic government ruled), the party came to be seen as the main culprits behind the country\u2019s floundering political and economic fortunes. With galloping inflation, rising unemployment and eroding purchasing power, resentment towards the Islamists grew steadily. Post-election alliances with Nidaa Tounes (2014), and Qalb Tounes (2019) hurt their cause further by giving credence to the notion of a democracy co-opted by a handful of elites. So too did accusations of corruption and embezzlement and public perceptions related to the post-2011 security crisis: Whether due to their being inept governors or cynical conspirators, many Tunisians saw Ennahda as responsible for the attacks at the Bardo museum and Sousse beach in 2015 and for the political assassinations of Chokri Belaid and Mohamed Brahmi in 2013. All this led to Rached Ghannouchi earning the worst favorability scores of any Tunisian political figure while he was in charge of the Assembly of People’s Representatives prior to Saied\u2019s coup.[9]<\/a> And all this informs why the party had no capacity to turn an election boycott into a meaningful political weapon: They might have persuaded their dwindling number of voters to stay at home this past fall, but stood no chance of using this to delegitimize Saied\u2019s claim to power.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The various descendants of the Destourians were equally hapless in the autumn.[10]<\/a> The faction led by Abir Moussi, the Parti Destourien Libri (PDL), actually led the polls on the eve of Saied\u2019s coup in 2021.[11]<\/a> This had been achieved on the back of Mousi\u2019s virulent anti-Islamism and rejectionist positioning vis-\u00e0-vis 2011\u2019s revolution: Casting herself as an agent of stability amidst a decade of chaos, Moussi gained more momentum as the shortcomings of the democratic transition accumulated.[12]<\/a> Alas, with Saied\u2019s coup d’\u00e9tat in July 2021, Mousi and the PDL saw their political cause appropriated by a more virulent champion: Voters hitherto inclined to put their hopes in the Moussi alternative instead aligned themselves with a President who had made that alternative real. In the two years that followed, the PDL was left in the awkward position of opposing a regime which shared in its politics. The resulting incoherence cost Moussi and the PDL support, though did not weaken them enough to convince Saied she might not one day become a threat. As a result, the President had Moussi arrested in October 2023 after she had lodged complaints against the President\u2019s rule-by-decree governance.[13]<\/a> The move disqualified Moussi from contesting for the Presidency in 2024 and delivered a so-far irrecoverable blow to the PDL: The party had neither the institutional footprint nor popular buy-in needed to leverage abstentionism into a broader challenge.\u00a0\u00a0 Over the ten year democratic transition, none of the leftist camps were able to approach a plurality in the legislature, to convince the other camps to align, or to carve out a steady electoral presence. After the 2021 coup d’\u00e9tat, this motley of actors fractured again, this time into supporters and opponents of President Kais Saied.[16]<\/a> The Arab nationalists and part of the radical left (the Democratic Patriots Movement most prominently) lined up behind Saied. Contrarily, the social democratic left and the Workers’ Party, a Marxist outfit, formed a coalition to oppose the coup on the eve of the 2022 referendum.[17]<\/a> The breaks within the wider leftist tent compounded existing problems. It also did nothing to improve troubles that all leftist currents have with elitism and social disconnectedness. This all being the case, when the elections for the Presidency were held in October, the left could neither speak with a single voice nor bring real political pressure to bear.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Outside the realm of partisan politics, opposition forces have also found little traction in pushing back against Saied. Much of this can be explained by the developments within civil society. There, the combination of Carthage-directed repression and inadequate performance has had profound consequences.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A big part of this story concerns the Union G\u00e9n\u00e9rale des Travailleurs Tunisiens (UGTT), the country’s main trade union center.[18]<\/a> Saliently, the UGTT\u2019s leadership supported the measures taken by Kais Saied on July 25, 2021, if hedging their support with calls for constitutional guarantees of democratic governance.[19]<\/a> Once the writing was on the wall concerning Saied\u2019s intentions, the same leadership turned on Carthage, publicly criticizing Saied\u2019s instituting of Decree 117.[20]<\/a> Thereafter, the UGTT\u2019s national leadership did take a distance from Saied: In 2022, for instance, the UGTT refused to participate in the commission the President established for deliberating on a new constitution.[21]<\/a> The arrest of Anis Kaabi in early 2023, General Secretary of the Motorways Union, revealed Saied\u2019s approach for dealing with these challenges.<\/p>\n\n\n\n By 2024, the UGTT was something of a spent force politically. Its demonstrations attracted hundreds where they once drew thousands, its attempts at organizing a national dialogue floundered, and its weight on decision-makers calculations was greatly diminished. The organization\u2019s decline find its source in two places. The first is Noureddine Taboubi, an autocratic character who amended the union’s internal regulations to allow him to run for a third Presidential term. The second is the union\u2019s own divisions. A large share of the UGTT’s rank and file, those of far-left and Arab nationalist currents especially, remain big boosters of Saied. (Cognizant of this, Saied appointed Mohamed Ali Boughediri, a prominent trade unionist, to head the Ministry of Education in 2023). This makes opposing the President a fraught prospect.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For an indication of just how far the UGTT has fallen, consider Noureddine Taboubi\u2019s September 2023 declaration that \u201csilence was also a form of militancy.\u201d A confession of powerlessness if there ever was one.[22]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Repressive interventions from Carthage have likewise ensured that Tunisia\u2019s NGOs, another pillar of democratic transition, cannot oppose his agenda.[23]<\/a> Saied\u2019s machinations have been deft in this regard. Specifically, he has capitalized on and amplified preexisting public unease around social associations. The unease stems from a mix of legitimate concerns and disinformation as relates to particular associations\u2019 financial opacity and political linkages.[24]<\/a> Piggybacking on this, Saied has regularly claimed Tunisia\u2019s civil society organizations to be foreign agents and declared that they are a threat to national sovereignty.[25]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n On October 10, 2023, parliamentarians under Saied\u2019s direction presented a bill to the Assembly of People’s Representatives which would reshape the legal landscape for associations full-cloth.[26]<\/a> Though not as yet passed, Saied has leveraged the law\u2019s spectre to create a chill across civil society. He has also shown no hesitation in targeting leaders in the sector for arrest. Witness the arrests of Saadia Mosbah[27]<\/a>, President of the Mnemty Association working to combat racial discrimination in Tunisia, and Sherifa Riahi[28]<\/a>, former executive director of the migrant aid association Tunisie Terre d’Asile. Through these maneuvers, Saied has paralyzed Tunisian civil society for all effects and purposes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Nor is the likelihood of opposition mobilizing on the street very high. Certainly, it was the street that played an essential role in the transition to democracy\u2014and in consolidating the democracy thereafter. Since July 25th<\/sup>, 2021, however, the popular energy that once pulsed out there has been significantly diminished. A number of demonstrations were organized with relative success in the run-up to the presidential elections in October of last year, it should be said. A demonstration organized by left-wing youth collectives in May 2024 to protest against Decree 54 and the arrests of journalists gathered large crowds. The Network for the Defense of Rights and Freedoms, an alliance of left-wing parties and civil society associations, also brought big numbers to the street in a series of demonstrations denouncing the anti-democratic context of the elections and the ISIE’s authoritarian actions. None of these efforts, however, proved lasting or of a magnitude sufficient to sway Carthage\u2019s decision-making.<\/p>\n\n\n\n On balance, the street, like civil society and political parties, looks be exhausted. As many indicators establish, young people are less and less involved in the public arena today, and the climate of fear installed after the coup has had a direct impact on people\u2019s willingness to mobilize for demonstrations<\/p>\n\n\n\n The fall of Ben Ali\u2019s regime has many causes, but in the most immediate sense, it was compelled by relentless street pressure and the demonstrations that took place between December 17, 2010 and January 14, 2011. During the Constituent Assembly period, the sit-ins that took place in the summer of 2013 after the assassinations of Chokri Belaid and Mohamed Brahmi also forced leading political actors to take part in the national dialogue, a dialogue which ultimately delivered the country from its political crisis. Between 2015 and 2017, meanwhile, when President Beji Caid Essebsi had proposed a bill on reconciliation with the old guard of the Ben Ali Regime, it was again the mobilization of young people in the \u201cMenich Msemah\u201d movement which led to the bill being rolled back and gutted. Demonstrations on July 25th<\/sup>, 2021 also had a hand, if not a decisive one, in Saied\u2019 coup.<\/p>\n<\/details>\n\n\n\n One cannot deny that by weaponizing the law in the manner he has, Kais Saied made opposing his rule an incredibly challenging prospect. Nevertheless, the relative ease with which Saied has consolidated his power suggests that the weakness of Tunisia\u2019s opposition has also played a significant role in the course of events.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Whether one speaks of the partisan actors that led the democratic transition, the UGTT, or those operating in civil society today, the following is clear: None has the institutional strength, social groundedness, or political vision to present an alternative to Kais Saied. The reasons for the opposition\u2019s weakness are manifold. Regardless, though, the effect is to buttress Saied\u2019s grip on authority. Whatever the President\u2019s flaws\u2014and they are innumerable\u2014absent an opposition with real teeth and capacity, authoritarianism will persist. It may be in the form of Kais Saied\u2019s regime. It may be in the form of a military junta. But until opposition forces can embed themselves within society, democracy will not be in the cards. <\/p>\n\n\n\n [1]<\/a> Human Rights Watch, \u201cTunisie, un d\u00e9cret sur la cybercriminalit\u00e9 utilis\u00e9 contre les d\u00e9tracteurs des autorit\u00e9s\u201d, hrw.org<\/em>, December 19th 2023.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [2]<\/a> Frida Dahmani, \u201cZeghidi, Bsaies, Dahmani\u2026 En Tunisie, tension maximale apr\u00e8s l\u2019arrestation de plusieurs chroniqueurs radio\u201d, Jeune Afrique, <\/em>May 13th 2024.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [3]<\/a> La R\u00e9daction d\u2019Inkydafa, \u201cAffaire du complot contre la s\u00fbret\u00e9 de l\u2019Etat : un an apr\u00e8s, quel bilan ?\u201d, Inkyfada, <\/em>February 11th 2024.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [4]<\/a> Jeune Afrique avec AFP, \u201cEn Tunisie, la mainmise de Kais Saied sur la Justice contest\u00e9e dans la rue\u201d, Jeune Afrique, <\/em>June 1st 2023<\/p>\n\n\n\n [5]<\/a> Le monde avec AFP, \u201cUn candidat \u00e0 la pr\u00e9sidentielle condamn\u00e9 \u00e0 huit mois de prison et \u00e0 une in\u00e9ligibilit\u00e9 \u00e0 vie\u201d, Le Monde, <\/em>July 19th 2024.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [6]<\/a> S.H. \u201cSafi Said condamn\u00e9 \u00e0 quatre mois de prison par contumace\u201d, Businessnews.com<\/em>, June 26th 2024.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [7]<\/a> S.G. \u201cK2Rhym : on a refus\u00e9 de me fournir mon bulletin n\u00b03\u201d, Businessnews.com, <\/em>August 5th 2024.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [8]<\/a> Malik Ben Salem, \u201cEn Tunisie, vers une pr\u00e9sidentielle \u201cqui balaye l\u2019Etat de droit\u201d\u201d, Courrier International, <\/em>September 3rd 2024.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [9]<\/a> Khalil Jelassi, \u201cSondages et barom\u00e8tres politiques : Rached Ghannouchi l\u2019\u00e9ternel impopulaire\u201d, Lapresse.tn, <\/em>June 2nd<\/sup> 2021.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [10]<\/a> The Destour family is heir to the Neo-Destour party, founded by Bourguiba in 1934 and at the forefront of the struggle for decolonization. Initially N\u00e9o-Destour, then Parti Socialiste Destourien, and finally Rassemblement Constitutionnel D\u00e9mocratique under Ben Ali, this party governed the country from 1956 to 2011. After the Revolution, the party was dissolved, and several political formations subsequently claimed the heritage of the Destour family, the most notable being Nidaa Tounes, formed by former president B\u00e9ji Caid Essebsi, and having governed hand in hand with the Islamists from 2014 to 2019, then the Parti Destourien Libre (PDL) guided by Abir Moussi.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [11]<\/a> Nadia Dejoui, \u201cIntentions de vote : Kais Saied et le PDL toujours en t\u00eate du classement\u201d, L\u2019\u00e9conomiste Maghr\u00e9bin, <\/em>May 25th 2021.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [12]<\/a> Mousi led her party to a third place finish in terms of votes in the legislative elections of 2019, winning 6.63% of the ballots cast. She climbed to the top of the polls in the two years that followed and the PDL was in first place in terms of voting intentions for several months in 2021.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [13]<\/a> Jeune Afrique avec AFP, \u201cEn Tunisie, arrestation de Abir Moussi\u201d, Jeuneafrique.com, <\/em>October 4th 2023.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [14]<\/a> Meher Kacem, \u201cPr\u00e9sidentielle 2024 \/ Intentions de vote : Mondher Zenaidi en deuxi\u00e8me position\u201d, Radioexpressfm.net, <\/em>April 3rd 2024<\/p>\n\n\n\n [15]<\/a> In 2011, the Social-Democratic Left was most ascendant and led by the Forum D\u00e9mocratique pour le Travail et les Libert\u00e9s (FDTL): The FDTL sent twenty deputies to the Constituent Assembly, followed by the Parti D\u00e9mocrate Progressiste (PDP) with 16 deputies, and the P\u00f4le D\u00e9mocratique Moderniste with 5 deputies. Come 2014, the Popular Front alliance, made up mainly of Marxist and Arab nationalist parties, was on top, sending 15 deputies to the Assembly of People’s Representatives. Five years later, the Social Dems took back the reins, with the Courant D\u00e9mocratique, an offshoot from the CPR, winning 22 deputies, seven more than the Mouvement du Peuple (Arab Nationalist).<\/p>\n\n\n\n [16]<\/a> Hakim Fekih, \u201cTunisie. A gauche, fractures ouvertes face \u00e0 Kais Saied\u201d, OrientXXI,<\/em> April 26th 2023.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [17]<\/a> Yosra Ouanes, \u201cTunisie : 5 partis politiques lancent une campagne pour renverser le r\u00e9f\u00e9rendum Constitutionnel\u201d, aa.com.tr, <\/em>June 2nd<\/sup> 2022<\/p>\n\n\n\n [18]<\/a> Founded in 1946 by Farhat Hached, the UGTT played a leading role in the struggle for independence, was behind the main uprisings against the dictatorship, notably in 1978 and 2008, and was one of the main driving forces behind the 2011 Revolution. During the democratic transition, organization was a leading political player, notably thanks to the role it played during the crisis of summer 2013, which earned it the Nobel Peace Prize with the National Dialogue Quartet in 2015.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [19]<\/a> C.B.Y, \u201cTunisie : l\u2019UGTT appelle \u00e0 accompagner les mesures exceptionnelles prises par Saied d\u2019un ensemble de garanties constitutionnelles\u201d, Kapitalis, <\/em>July 26th 2021<\/p>\n\n\n\n [20]<\/a> Frida Dahmani, \u201cTunisie : L\u2019UGTT, premi\u00e8re force d\u2019opposition \u00e0 Kais Saied ?\u201d, Jeuneafrique.com, <\/em>December 7th 2021<\/p>\n\n\n\n [21]<\/a> Le Monde avec AFP, \u201cEn Tunisie, la centrale syndicale rejette le dialogue propos\u00e9 par le pr\u00e9sident Kais Saied\u201d, Le Monde, <\/em>May 24th 2022<\/p>\n\n\n\n [22]<\/a> LM, \u201cTunisie – VIDEO : Tabboubi : Le silence est une forme de militantisme\u201d, Tunisienumerique.com, <\/em>September 10th 2023<\/p>\n\n\n\n [23]<\/a> During the transition to democracy, the Tunisian associative landscape underwent a veritable revolution, with the decree-law 2011-88 put in place by the High Instance for the Realization of the Objectives of the Revolution, Political Reform and Democratic Transition guaranteeing freedom of association in Tunisia. This decree, combined with the atmosphere of freedom that reigned in the country after the revolution, resulted in the creation of no fewer than 13,000 associations between 2011 and 2020. The associative sector thus experienced its golden age during the post-revolutionary period.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [24]<\/a> Khalil Jelassi, \u201cFinancement douteux des associations et interf\u00e9rence avec la vie politique : Des m\u00e9canismes juridiques de contr\u00f4le limit\u00e9s\u201d, Lapresse.tn, <\/em>July 16th 2019<\/p>\n\n\n\n [25]<\/a> S.H, \u201cKais Saied tire \u00e0 boulets rouges sur les associations financ\u00e9es de l\u2019\u00e9tranger\u201d, businessnews.com.tn<\/em>, September 26th 2024<\/p>\n\n\n\n [26]<\/a> Zeineb Ben Ismail et Jawher Djelassi, \u201cLoi sur les associations : un projet qui met la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 civile en p\u00e9ril\u201d, Inkyfada.com, <\/em>December 13th 2023.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
There is little doubt that Saied\u2019s triumph was assured by the manner with which the Presidential election was organized. That is not to say, however, that Tunisia\u2019s opposition might have won had the plebiscite been fairly contested. Indeed, the opposition\u2019s weakness at our current juncture is difficult to overstate. As this weakness is fundamental to Tunisia\u2019s future\u2014at once contributing to the longevity of Saied\u2019s power and the poor prospects of a democratic restoration\u2014an audit of its causes has become necessary.<\/p>\n\n\n\nChanging the Rules of the Game<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Coup d’\u00e9tat and Repression of Freedoms<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Abstentionism in Tunisia: A Timeline<\/summary>\n
Popular Disconnect and a Failed Boycott<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
A second Destourian current, this one spearheaded by the aforementioned Mondher Zenaidi, also proved unable to withstand a Saied offensive. A member of the old guard who had held ministerial portfolios including health, tourism, transport and trade under Ben Ali, Zenaidi presented himself as an independent technocrat and statesman last fall. The sell was compelling enough to lift him to the top opposition spot in many pre-election polls[14]<\/a>. The polls sufficed to have Zenaidi, campaigning from abroad, regarded as a danger by Carthage. This led to his candidacy being annulled on the pretext of an incomplete sponsorship file. Lacking a real social base, Zenaidi could not level a response to Carthage\u2019s repression.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Tunisia\u2019s partisan left was equally unequipped in October (and even more unequipped now) to mobilize an opposition. Historically, the Tunisian left has been compromised by internal divisions. Occupying a spectrum defined at at its poles by opposition to the old regime and the Islamists, respectively, this political tendency continues to be made up of a multitude of parties and ideological currents. Broadly speaking, it is possible to identify three main camps, each of which contains its own cleavages: the Social Democratic Left, the Marxist Left and the Pan-Arab Left.[15]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\nA Powerless Civil Society<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
The Submission of the UGTT<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
NGOs Repressed and Rejected<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
A Demobilized Street<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Street Politics: A Brief History<\/summary>\n
Conclusions<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n