{"id":50,"date":"2020-12-07T23:30:42","date_gmt":"2020-12-07T23:30:42","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.noria-research.com\/?p=19607"},"modified":"2026-03-03T11:29:46","modified_gmt":"2026-03-03T10:29:46","slug":"when-repression-leaves-the-shadows-in-jordan","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/noria-research.com\/mena\/when-repression-leaves-the-shadows-in-jordan\/","title":{"rendered":"When repression leaves the shadows in Jordan"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Order, reform, and stability: such might be the byword of the Hashemite monarchy, which seemingly weathered the Arab Spring with no incidents of violence. The government managed to skillfully showcase a gradual \u2018democratization\u2019 of the system in response to popular demand for political change.  However, the severe crackdown on the opposition throughout 2020 shed light on a coercive system, the functioning of which was long invisibilized, together with its opponents. The condemnation of this repression as well as the varied and continuing demands of its society seem to bear out the end of the enchanted interlude that the monarchy had enjoyed after 2011. <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In Jordan, the crackdown was as harsh as it\nwas unexpected. In 2020, at the height of summer, the Court of Cassation banned\nthe country\u2019s main opposition movement, the Muslim Brotherhood.  A few weeks later, authorities announced the\nshutdown of the teachers\u2019 union, and around one thousand of its members were\narrested for participating in protests. In addition to this major police\nintervention, Jordanian journalists were forbidden from reporting on the\nteachers\u2019 protests; about fifteen were arrested for violating this order. The\nlast episode in this series of repressive actions was the arrest of renowned\ncartoonist Emad Hajjaj after he published a cartoon mocking the normalization\nof relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates.    <\/p>\n\n\n\n

This series of events clashes with the image that Jordan strives to present, that of a stable Middle-Eastern country, with a strong record of economic and political reforms. But the country\u2019s recent history shows that its political system relies on the coercion and repression of dissenting voices. The somber fiftieth anniversary of the Black September events in 1970 between the Jordanian military and thousands of Palestinian fighters, is a reminder of the regime\u2019s long history of political violence. Social and political protests were also suppressed for decades under martial law, though with greater subtlety.   <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Starting with the phase of \u2018democratic\nopening\u2019 in the 1990s, control over dissenting opinions became more discreet.\nThe electoral system that was chosen in 1993 led to a weakening of the\nopposition movements, and journalists were closely supervised to ensure they\nwould echo the official narrative of a country \u2018in the process of\ndemocratization\u2019. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Part 1. A political power shaped by control<\/h1>\n\n\n\n

Thus, the 2020 crackdowns are not so much a\nreflection of a deepening authoritarianism, as a surfacing of practices that\nhad hitherto been hidden. This analysis focuses on the factors behind the\nunmasking of the coercive strategies deployed by the ruling power. The\nnarrative of the never-ending \u2018reform\u2019 of Jordan\u2019s political system, claimed to\nbe underway since the 1990s, has gradually lost its credibility, in the face of\ncontinued repression of political parties, trade unions, and the media. Those\ncoercive practices progressively came to light in three major stages.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The first stage was a long term process\nthat began just after the popular uprisings of the Arab Spring. While they\npromptly announced and implemented political reforms, the authorities\nsimultaneously sought to weaken opposition voices, especially that of the Muslim\nBrotherhood. The second stage began in 2019, when about fifteen political\nactivists were arrested for posting messages on social media that criticized\nJordan\u2019s regime or the King himself. The third stage is the recent repression\nof journalists, of the teachers\u2019 union and of the Muslim Brotherhood yet\nagain.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The economic crisis triggered by the Covid-19 pandemic led to a shift in the authorities\u2019 strategy towards stricter, and thus more visible, preventive repression. Their aim is to stifle any potential social movement, even at the expense of their image as an increasingly democratic country. At the same time, in response to the increasingly strident demands voiced by established political groups, the central authorities tightened their grip on the country through a broader crackdown intended to reassert their control. The latest stage thus seems to mark the end of an \u2018enchanted interlude\u2019 for the Hashemite monarchy, which since 2011 had managed to maintain its image as a regime that could both control and appease its people and popular demands without violence.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The 2020 repression is but the most recent\nand visible manifestation of the longstanding coercive system that allowed\nJordanian authorities to permanently establish their power. For decades, this\nauthoritarian regime has relied on discreet methods in order not to jeopardize\nthe image of a reformist government that they marketed to their Western allies.\n<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Discreet but\nsystemic repression<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Since the end of the 1990s, development institutions have considered Jordan to be a country \u2018in the process of democratization\u2019, making it a favored partner for Western powers in the Middle-East. This status stems partly from the fact that Jordan was the second Arab state to sign a peace treaty with Israel, in 1994. King Abdullah II has ruled the country since the death of his father Hussein in 1999, and has cultivated an image as a modern monarch in his approach toward government and his attitude toward the people. Desirous of maintaining the impression of a stable and reformist country, he responded to the 2011 Arab Spring protests – which, in Jordan, mainly called for political reforms1<\/a><\/sup> \u2013 by amending the Constitution, dissolving the government, and creating an independent electoral commission, to guarantee democratic elections. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In July 2018, during the month of Ramadan,\nthousands of people took to the streets once again in an echo of the 2011\nprotests. This time, they were peacefully opposing a tax reform and a rise in\nfuel and electricity prices. While images of police officers laughing with protesters<\/a>\n(in Arabic) went viral on social media, the King reacted to this lower and\nmiddle-class social movement by vehemently criticizing the government\u2019s\npolicies, leading to the resignation of the Prime Minister at the time. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In a way, those two events reveal the\narchitecture of Jordan\u2019s political system, in which the King has a central and\noverarching position. He is the supreme leader of the armed forces and holds\nexecutive power. In 2016, his authority was expanded by an amendment to the\nConstitution allowing him to appoint the state\u2019s highest officials without the\napproval of the Prime Minister. He ratifies and promulgates laws, has the power\nto dissolve the Parliament, and establishes the electoral timetable. Under his\nauthority, the Royal Court (al-diwan\nal-malaki<\/em>) oversees the implementation of his decisions and initiatives.\nThe inner workings of the court and daily activities of its committees are kept\nrelatively secret. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Contrary to the Court and the King, the\ngovernment, whose role is mostly limited to representation and policy\nexecution, is a constant target of media attention. Currently, it is mainly\ncomposed of technocrats and must, above all else, ensure the equal distribution\nof ministries among the social elites of the country\u2019s twelve governorates. The\ngovernment also recruits through co-optation, which allows it to assimilate\nsome political opponents and members of civil society. As for the Parliament,\nconsisting of the House of Representatives and the Senate, it is a remarkably\nweak and marginal institution. For instance, it is impossible for\nrepresentatives to propose a bill if the government has not signed off on it\nfirst. Lastly, Jordan\u2019s intelligence service is the centerpiece of the\npolitical system, although it maintains a low profile. Since the early 2000s,\nits powers have been expanded yet further in the context of the fight against\nterrorism (see HumanRights Watch<\/a> report). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Jordan\u2019s political system relies on a\nhighly centralized, personalized power structure that favors authoritarianism.\nThe intense repression of summer 2020 revealed the extent of the coercive\napparatus, which had been hidden until then behind the image of a reformist\ncountry that formed the basis for the Kingdom\u2019s outward stance. The control of\nall types of opposition \u2013 political groups, the media, unions, and\norganizations- is exerted through overt or covert repression at the hands of\nthe military, the police, and the intelligence services. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

This system was first established by\nmartial law, an extraordinary measure taken in 1967 by King Hussein following\nthe Six-Day War, to be abrogated in 1991. The law was justified by the need to strengthen\nthe state against the growing influence of Palestinian forces in the country,\nand it led to the prohibition of political parties, the cancelation of\nelections and direct control over civil society for more than three decades. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

This institutionalized repression peaked during the 1970 Black September confrontation, when the Jordanian Armed Forces killed 3,000 to 7,000 Palestinians2<\/a><\/sup> \u2013 mainly civilians \u2013 who were living in the country. Fearing a political coup orchestrated by the Palestine Liberation Organization\u2019s feddayins <\/em>(members of armed groups), King Hussein, emboldened by the West\u2019s support, violently crushed the social movement and drove the Palestinian organization out of the country and into Lebanon.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Twenty years later, in 1989, under pressure\nfrom strong large-scale protests and the admonition of international donors,\nwho were prominent supporters of the monarchy, Jordan began a \u2018democratization\u2019\nprocess. Hussein allowed political parties to reemerge; for the first time\nsince 1967, general elections were held, and freedom of the press was\nguaranteed by law. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Democratizing for greater control<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

After 1990, the political authorities\nadopted a new repression strategy. Protests were no longer systematically\nsuppressed, but they were targeted and inconspicuously controlled. The\ngovernment also tried to respond to protests with social reforms. The massive\nprotests of 1989 and 1996 which began in two Southern cities \u2013 Ma\u2019an and Kerak\nrespectively \u2013 illustrated this new approach. The popular backlash against the\nrise in oil and bread prices was still suppressed (20 dead in 1989, 200 arrests\nin 1996), but it led to the announcement of new political reforms and the\nrepeal of martial law.   <\/p>\n\n\n\n

This reformist fa\u00e7ade gradually molded\nJordan\u2019s national image over the last three decades. It went hand in hand with\nthe invisibilization of repressive actions, especially after the Arab Spring,\nallowing public authorities to both preserve the monarchy\u2019s power and contain\nprotest movements. Under this strategy, the Royal Court demanded the\nresignation of the government twice, in 2011 and in 2018, to assuage\nprotesters\u2019 anger. However, the undermining of opposition forces continued,\nalthough more covertly than before.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In addition to all of the above, the electoral system is also used as a tool of coercion. After the Islamists \u2013 the biggest opposition movement in the country – won the general elections by a significant margin in 1989, with about 40% of Parliamentary seats, a royal decree replaced the system of multiple voting with the sawt al wahed<\/em>ou, the \u2018one-man-one-vote\u2019 or  single non-transferable voting system. In 1989, voters could cast as many ballots as there were seats up for election in their constituency. But starting in 1993, they could only vote for one candidate, and they often chose a member of their own tribe or one of their relatives, who were accessible middlemen and with whom they had stronger bonds of mutual dependence. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

This new voting system led to the high\nprevalence of votes for tribal candidates, rather than for political groups.\nIts purpose is to encourage a personal bond between voters and office-seekers,\nrather than a party-based link. This allowed the authorities to limit the\nnumber of votes cast in favor of political parties, especially opposition\ngroups such as left-wing parties or the Islamic Action Front (IAF), the\npolitical wing of the Muslim Brotherhood. With only ten representatives out of\n130, the IAF was the most prominent party in the House of Representatives (majlis al-nuwwab<\/em>) between 2016 and\n2020.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Jordanian Parliament, , Amman. \u00a9 Camille Abescat, 2020 <\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n
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Control of the political arena is also ensured by electoral district boundaries, which reinforce the perception of elections as a patronage system and deepen inequalities between \u2018Transjordanians3<\/a><\/sup>\u2019, seen as supporters of the regime, and Jordanians of Palestinian descent, who are considered potential opponents. Since the reign of King Hussein (1952-1999), Jordanian authorities have tried to secure the loyalty of Transjordanians through patronage, by redistributing financial and symbolic resources, for instance in the form of public office jobs. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Electoral boundaries benefit\nmajority-Transjordanian urban and rural areas, ensuring their\nover-representation in Parliament. In 1989, the new electoral cycle coincided\nwith a national economic and political crisis, leading the regime to treat the\nParliament as an institution made up of seats based on various levels of\npatronage, especially when it came to the Transjordanian regions.\nRepresentatives became brokers between the state and the population, granting\nselect citizens preferential access to public funds, often in the form of\nemployment and scholarships. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The difference in voter turnout between\ngovernorates shows that Transjordanians are the main beneficiaries of the\nsystem, as they hold more than 75% seats while representing less than 50% of\nthe total population. The Amman and Zarqa Governorates, which are home to most\nof the Palestinians and Jordanians of Palestinian origin in Jordan, always\nregister the lowest turnouts.   <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The rationale behind the electoral\nboundaries, and their effects, are summed up below by a former pro-Palestinian\nactivist who is now a member of the left-wing Jordanian Social Democratic\nParty:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u2018We believe that the best system\nwould be to have a single national constituency, to allow party members and\nsocial and political movements to work together on a national list of\ncandidates, and then be divided into groups in Parliament. But in Jordan we\nencounter a demographic issue, because if we only had one constituency for\ngeneral elections, then there would be a risk that all of the representatives\nmight come from the capital. And you know that in Amman (\u2026) there is a\nPalestinian majority, so the demographic representation in Parliament would\nchange and that frightens Jordanians.\u2019<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In 2016, a proportional voting system was\nestablished by law in order to satisfy one of the major demands of the 2011\nprotesters. The new system allows voters to choose as many candidates as there\nare seats in their constituencies, but the country\u2019s constituency boundaries\nwere kept in place. The same activist adds:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u2018Now we have a proportional system,\nbut it is based on small constituencies, whereas a proportional system should\nbe based on large constituencies (\u2026) But they don\u2019t want any large political\ngroups in Parliament. They want people to come as individuals, because in this\nnew system it is hard for a list of candidates to win more than one seat per\nconstituency.\u2019 <\/p>\n\n\n\n

As a result, over the years, the Parliament gradually lost its credibility as an institution. During the summer 2018 protests, Jordanians were chanting slogans such as \u2018In Jordan, we have a convenience store we call Parliament\u2019 (\u0641\u064a \u0627\u0644\u0623\u0631\u062f\u0646 \u0639\u0646\u0651\u0627 \u062f\u0643\u0627\u0646\u060c \u0628\u0633\u0645\u0651\u0648\u0647\u0627 \u0628\u0631\u0644\u0645\u0627\u0646). Intelligence services are also often accused of interfering with election results4<\/a><\/sup>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Parliament is generally described as mere theatre, as it has no legislative role or control over the government, partly because representatives have to bend to the will of the ministries, which they consult every week in order to satisfy voters\u2019 clientelist requests. To remain in the government\u2019s good graces, representatives must support the executive branch when voting for amendments and important bills. Some of the representatives themselves share this critical view of the system, attributing their lack of political power to their clientelist dependency on the government. For example, a representative explains: <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u2018My position as a representative is difficult.\nSometimes I have to be very weak when putting questions to a minister, because\nI know that I will have to ask him for favors for my voters the next day. If we\nweren\u2019t constantly asking for favors, we would be stronger. But if I go and see\na minister and ask him \u201cCould you please transfer this employee to this\nsection,\u201d and he grants me that favor, then I won\u2019t be able to stand up to him\nwith the other representatives during the question period. We are always asking\nfor favors, and many representatives suffer from that.\u2019 <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Information\ncontrol<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

In addition to undermining opposition\nforces, Jordan\u2019s coercive system relies on control over information production\nin the country. Two strategies are used: making sure that the official version\nof events is as widespread as possible, and weakening or discrediting\nalternative voices. The official version is mainly disseminated by major daily\nnewspapers such as Al-Rai<\/em> and Ad-Dustour, <\/em>which act as mouthpieces for\npolitical authorities.  <\/em> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Significant financial resources are\ninvested to encourage young Jordanian journalists to contribute to a positive\nimage of the country, as illustrated by the creation of a new public TV\nchannel, Al-Mamlaka <\/em>(\u2018The Kingdom\u2019),\nwhere journalists are paid almost 800 Jordanian dinars (1 000\u20ac), nearly\nthree times the average pay in the profession. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The close relationship between the Court and the media is not new. In 1976, King Hussein created the Jordan Times<\/em>, the first English-language newspaper for foreign readers, which was quickly dubbed \u2018The King\u2019s newspaper\u2019<\/em>. A former journalist summarizes the links between the Jordan Times<\/em> and political authorities:    <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u2018As a journalist, my job was to translate the King\u2019s messages for the world (\u2026) To be honest I mainly reported on what the King did or said (\u2026) We sometimes received a phone call in the evening to put some official statement on the front page (\u2026), but we didn\u2019t let ourselves be pushed around, we had to negotiate everyday with the political power, we had to compromise.\u2019<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In 2006, the Royal Court expanded its\ninfluence on the media by establishing the Jordan Media Institute (JMI), which\nwas founded by Princess Rym (wife of the current king\u2019s stepbrother, Prince Ali),\nand has become a reference for journalism training centers. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

At the same time, public authorities\nresorted to a series of strategies to weaken and marginalize independent\njournalism. The Press and Publications Law was adopted in 1998 and it allowed\nthe government to regulate the media by arbitrarily granting authorizations to\npublish. The law was used as a justification to close down more than 250 news websites in 2013<\/a>\non the grounds that they were not in compliance with official conditions.   <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Electronic Crime Law, amended in 2018,\nis another of the favorite tools of the authorities. This law was allegedly\nadopted to combat \u2018hate speech\u2019 \u2013 which remains a vague concept in the legal\ntext \u2013 online, and it allows the arrest and arbitrary imprisonment of anyone\nwho posts messages on social media that are considered politically or morally\nunacceptable. Control of the internet is all the more important politically as\nJordanians now get their information online, mostly on Facebook (5.5 million\naccounts for 10 million inhabitants) in order to bypass the censorship imposed\non public media. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

On the internet, Jordanians can access\nopinion articles written by journalists that would be censored in national\nnewspapers, posts by activists and political campaigners, and foreign media\narticles not subject to national media control. Following this shift of the\npublic debate toward social media, the Electronic Crime Law and the\nAnti-Terrorism Law were recently amended to permit the arrest of dozens of\npolitical opponents, journalists, and activists for messages that they had\nposted on Facebook or on the application Whatsapp.    <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Since it was amended in 2014, the Anti-Terrorism\nLaw has frequently been used against political opponents accused of \u2018harming\n[Jordan\u2019s] relationship with a foreign country\u2019 (art. 2) or of \u2018disturbing the\npublic order\u2019 (art.3), both actions being considered terrorism from then on.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Most journalists have been driven to self-censorship for fear of prosecution and the public humiliation campaigns that have been waged against dissident voices, while some citizens have had to creatively reinvent public debate in other ways. For instance, in 2013, a young jordanian co-founded Al-Hudood, <\/em>a critical and satirical news publication written in Arabic and modeled after websites such as The Onion<\/em> in the United-Kingdom or Le Gorafi<\/em> in France. He explains the origins of Al-Hudood<\/em>, which is now followed by nearly half a million people on Facebook: <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u2018People want to talk about politics, but they can\u2019t, so we found a back-door way to open the debate: we don\u2019t do journalism, we don\u2019t do news, our purpose is to make people laugh and cry through satirical articles, so that people can reflect on politics, and to normalize satire in the public debate (\u2026) We also want to criticize media coverage, tell traditional media journalists that they aren\u2019t doing their job.\u2019<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Part 2. Repression after the Spring<\/h1>\n\n\n\n

Although coercion is enshrined in the very\nheart of the Jordanian regime, its coercive practices have become increasingly\nharsh and visible since the Arab Spring. The first target was the Muslim\nBrotherhood, one of the major established opposition groups. Then, the\ngovernment focused on individual dissenters, especially through the Electronic\nCrime Law, which led to the arrest of about fifteen activists in 2019. The year\n2020 marks a new phase in the unmasking of state repression, with the decision\nto shut down the teachers\u2019 union and the detention of more than one thousand of\nits members.   <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Repressive practices more visible <\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The Muslim Brotherhood was one of the first main targets of the Jordanian government, echoing the repression they suffered in Egypt and Saudi Arabia starting in 2013. They had a personal enemy in Fay\u00e7al al Shawbaki, the new head of intelligence services, appointed a few years earlier5<\/a><\/sup>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Some of the Brothers, called reformists,\nlaunched the \u2018ZamZam<\/em>\u2019 initiative in\n2012 (named after the hotel where the launch meeting took place), bringing\ntogether more than 500 Jordanian public figures who signed a charter calling\nfor political reform. In 2015, Jordanian security services took advantage of\nthese early signs of dissension within the Brotherhood to ban the\nlong-established organization, informing the Brothers that their bylaws were no\nlonger compatible with the Jordanian Law on Associations.   <\/p>\n\n\n\n

At that point, two important members, Abdul\nMajid Thneibat and Rhayyel Gharaibeh, left the Brotherhood to create a rival\norganization, the Muslim Brothers Association (\u062c\u0645\u0639\u064a\u0629\n\u0627\u0644\u0625\u062e\u0648\u0627\u0646\u0627\u0644\u0645\u0633\u0644\u0645\u064a\u0646). Several of the\nBrotherhood\u2019s offices and financial assets were transferred to the new\norganization. Although this new association did not trigger a massive shift \u2013\nit only won three seats at the 2016 general elections \u2013 it did strip the\nBrotherhood and its political arm of part of its power in the national\npolitical arena. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In 2015, Zaki Bani Irsheid, the\nBrotherhood\u2019s deputy comptroller general, was sentenced to 18 months in prison\nfor criticizing the United Arab Emirates. The Jordanian Anti-Terrorism Law,\nwhich is frequently wielded against political opponents, was used to justify\nhis highly-publicized arrest. Since it was amended in 2014, the law has\ncategorized as terrorism any action that could \u2018harm [Jordan\u2019s] relationship\nwith a foreign country\u2019 (art. 3), while the concept of terrorism has been\nbroadened by the same amendment to cover anything that could \u2018disturb the\npublic order\u2019 (art. 2).    <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Beginning in 2013, political repression\nwent hand in hand with the increased centralization of power. In 2016, a\nconstitutional amendment was adopted, allowing Jordan\u2019s king to appoint various\nsenior state officers, including the president, the members of the Judicial\nCouncil, the Army Chief of Staff, the head of intelligence, and the chief of\npolice, as well as the president and members of the Senate, without needing the\ngovernment\u2019s approval, as was hitherto necessary (art. 40). This strengthening\nof the king\u2019s powers went relatively unnoticed in Jordan: it was overshadowed\nby the electoral reform announced the same year \u2013 although that reform had been\nin the pipeline since 2011 \u2013 and  by the\nadoption of the Decentralization Law in 2015. \n<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In 2019, repression reached new levels as\nit was intensified and extended to a broader spectrum of political opponents.\nThree members of the IAF were arrested between March and December 2019, along\nwith about fifteen activists, including several members of the Bani Hassan, one\nof the largest Jordanian tribes. More often than not, those arrests were\nmotivated by social media posts (see article<\/a> in Arabic).   <\/p>\n\n\n\n

This wave of arrests came in the aftermath\nof the 2018 protests, which represented an unprecedented time of public\nopposition to the government and even to the monarchy, especially from the main\nJordanian tribes. This large-scale social movement led to the dissolution of\nthe government, followed by a harsher political response with the appointment\nof Salameh Hamad, known to have little patience for protests, as the new\nMinister of Interior, and of General Ahmad Husni as head of intelligence.\nAccording to the decree of appointment, Husni was required by the king to keep\nan eye on anyone who dared to go against \u2018the foundations of the Jordanian\nconstitution\u2019.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Political parties, the Muslim Brotherhood,\nand Jordanians of Palestinian origin are no longer the only targets, as\ncriticism of public authorities can now come from any group of the population.\nIn addition to the arrests of activists mentioned before, repression began to\naffect sectors that had previously gone relatively unscathed, namely the media\nand trade unions. A Jordanian journalist describes the intimidation she was\nsubjected to:  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u2018I received a phone call from\nintelligence services after I posted on Facebook about the tax law [a tax\nreform that led to a wave of protests in June 2018]. They asked me to come to\ntheir offices, I went there alone, I was really scared (\u2026) They asked me to\nwrite a new Facebook post that was more positive about the tax law.\u2019 <\/p>\n\n\n\n

On top of the traditional psychological\npressure exerted by security services, some journalists working for foreign or\nnational publications were also beaten and arrested by police during the\nteachers\u2019 protests, the media coverage of which was banned by the authorities<\/a>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The teachers\u2019 union, which had been\npromised a wage increase in October 2019 after a one-month general strike, was\ninstead subjected to violent repression by the authorities, causing the union\nto shut down in July 2020, just before thousands of its members were arrested\nin August. Overall, 2020 marked the third stage of a process in which the\nregime\u2019s authoritarian practices became increasingly widespread and visible.\nUntil then, legal amendments, arrests, and the crackdown on the Muslim\nBrotherhood were carried out with relative discretion \u2013 that is, except for\nZaki Bani Ersheid\u2019s sentence \u2013 and the executive branch had refrained from\nviolently suppressing protests for two decades. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The fact that a trade union had been forced\nto shut down, especially one that was founded just after the Arab Spring, was\nalso unprecedented in Jordan\u2019s history. The frequent use of gag orders<\/em>, banning journalists from\nreporting on certain type of news, has been heavily condemned as well by the\nmedia and international organizations, in a country where freedom of speech is\nguaranteed by the Constitution (art. 15).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Loss of\nlegitimacy and a tarnished image of democracy<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The teachers\u2019 protests, which have been\nongoing since 2019, have allowed both observers and Jordanian authorities to\nfully grasp the political clout of professional unions. Recent events highlight\nthe broad legitimacy that they have gained, as well as their capacity to\npressure the central state. In October 2019, after more than a month of strikes\nthat paralyzed dozens of schools, and given the public\u2019s support for teachers,\nwho are seen as representatives of the working- and middle-class, the government\nhad to yield to their demands. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, the importance of those\norganizations is nothing new: trade unions became alternative venues for\nprotest when martial law was in effect from 1957 to 1991, and when political\nparties were outlawed. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Teachers were also able to create a\nconvergence of struggles among the opposition to the authorities\u2019 repressive\npractices. The union embodied resistance to both austerity measures and\nattempted repression by the state, which no political party had managed to do\nuntil then. This remarkable achievement is at least partly due to the\n\u2018de-ideologized\u2019 and non-denominational nature of the union, which allows it,\nunlike the IAF, to stand up for the interests of the entire population, in\nspite of the regime\u2019s attempts to portray it as being controlled by the Muslim\nBrotherhood. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Brotherhood publicly and repeatedly\nexpressed its support for the union, especially during the August 2020 wave of\narrests. Mourad al Adaylah, the Secretary-General of the IAF, also organized\nseveral official visits, accompanied by a delegation of the party, to meet the\nmembers of the union who had been liberated since the end of the summer. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

This unprecedented civil disobedience\nmovement \u2013 the last general strike before this one took place in 1989 \u2013 took\nJordanian authorities by surprise and tarnished the image of a stable country\nunder control. In this unusual context, the government\u2019s decision to dissolve\nthe union in July 2020, immediately after announcing a wage freeze in the\npublic sector, can be more fully understood. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Demonstrations in support of teachers were\nheld all over the country, in spite of the the ban on gatherings of more than\ntwenty people due to the state of public health emergency. Because of this ban,\nthe Court likely had not anticipated such protests, unlike those that took\nplace in 2011 and 2018, which were strictly controlled by the state. The heavy\nrepression that followed was both visible and relatively unprecedented; it\nseems to have been a deterrence measure meant to assert the government\u2019s\nstability and authority at the expense of its democratic fa\u00e7ade. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Obviously, this strategy entails\nconsequences both inside and outside of Jordan. On August 19th<\/sup>,\n2020, the Office of the United Nations High-Commissioner for Human Rights urged\nJordan to reverse the decision to close down the teachers\u2019 union, calling it a\n\u2018serious violation of the right of freedom to association\u2019. The crackdown on\nthe demonstrations in support of teachers is also an unheard-of event for\nJordanians themselves, who condemn the continued use of public health measures\nto justify the ban on protests. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n
\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n
<\/div>\n\n\n\n

The political authorities\u2019 legitimacy has\nbeen severely weakened by these events. Earlier large-scale popular uprisings\nfocused on economic grievances, such as purchasing power, but the regime\u2019s\nrepressive practices now seem to have shifted the focus onto its\nauthoritarianism. Consequently, the government\u2019s tight grip undermines the\nimage of democratization that the monarch has tried to project, especially after\n2011. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The ruling power has tried to invisibilize,\nor at least to make amends for, the repression of the past few months by\nannouncing that general elections would be held on November 10th<\/sup>,\n2020 after having been postponed due to the Covid-19 epidemic. However, this\nannouncement seems to be producing the opposite of its intended effect. In\nspite of the efforts made by the independent electoral commission, which was\ncreated in the wake of the Arab Spring to encourage citizens to vote and\nreassure them of the transparency of the electoral process, voter turnout is\nlikely to be at least as low as in previous years. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In 2016, only 37% of registered voters actually cast ballots. The number of votes won by the opposition will be determined by voter turnout, in a climate of harsh repression, and the IAF predicts massive interference by the intelligence services6<\/a><\/sup>. The party\u2019s spokesperson made a press statement: <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u2018Many reasons lead us to boycott the\nupcoming parliamentary elections. (\u2026) [especially] the context of the elections\neven before they start, and we have proof (\u2026) of very strong pressure,\nsurpassing anything we have seen in the past (\u2026) Candidates are being pressured\nnot to run in the elections.\u2019 (interview<\/a>, in Arabic)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Journalists for the left-wing daily newspaper Al-Ghad7<\/a><\/sup> highlighted the apparent contradiction between the holding of general elections and tribal consultations8<\/a><\/sup> and the prohibition of certain trade union elections, such as that of the lawyers\u2019 union, officially due to the coronavirus pandemic. Under the Jordanian system, before every election, the country\u2019s tribes and large families hold \u2018internal consultations\u2019 before every election in order to choose the candidate that will represent them. Naturally, they do not always reach a consensus, so several members of a tribe may run concurrently.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Other political parties that had been known\nso far for their friendly relations with the authorities have spoken out\nagainst the upcoming elections, for which both repressive and public health\nmeasures will prevent them from organizing election rallies. One member of the\nNational Constitutional Party has voiced his objections to the elections in the\nmedia and on social networks. On September 10th<\/sup>, he wrote in a\nFacebook post: \u2018We will not trust you or your elections, because of your\ninflexibility, your security measures, your promises of freedom and your lies.\u2019<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The events that have unfolded over the past\nfew months have led many media and political actors to expose the political\nsystem\u2019s democratic fa\u00e7ade, despite having previously agreed to play the\ngovernment\u2019s game while understanding its limits.  The election process and its results in\nNovember will reveal how effective this questioning of the official discourse\nactually was. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Conclusion <\/strong><\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The events of 2020 uncovered authoritarian\npractices inconsistent with the image that the Jordanian regime wants to\ncultivate outside its borders. With the successive reforms implemented since\nthe 1990s, the authorities were determined to defend a record that was almost a\nrarity for international donors: political stability, economic prosperity, and\ndemocratic pluralism. But behind this discourse, a discreetly coercive system\nwas maintained, invisibilizing both social demands and their repression by the\nauthorities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Beginning in 2011, the growing number of\nprotests was accompanied by intensified repression, which became more visible\nthan ever in 2020. The past few months seem to have marked the end of an\nenchanted interlude for Jordan in the wake of the Arab Spring. As with the\nMoroccan monarchy prior to the Rif movement in 2016, the Kingdom of Jordan\nmanaged to maintain the appearance of addressing social protests without\nviolence and without undermining its political legitimacy.    <\/p>\n\n\n\n

That illusion is now gone, as protests and criticisms are mounting in all sectors of Jordanian society (tribes, political parties, trade unions, the media, etc.), forcing the authorities to broaden and publicly reveal their repressive practices. Beyond the consequences for the national political scene, this unmasking could have repercussions for Jordan\u2019s relations with its foreign partners, including states, international organizations, and development agencies, which are key to the economic performance of the ruling power. <\/p>\n\n\n\n


Notes<\/h2>\n\n\n
  1. While protesters in Egypt and Tunisia asked for the fall of the regime, demonstrators in Jordan wanted to reform<\/em> it (\u0627\u0644\u0625\u0635\u0644\u0627\u062d). \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>
  2. The number of victims is disputed, especially because the Palestinian \u2018issue\u2019 is a very sensitive one in Jordan at the moment. The lower estimates establish the death toll at 3\u00a0500. \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>
  3. The term \u2018Transjordanians\u2019 refers to Jordanians whose families lived on the territory before 1948, whereas the Jordanians of Palestinian origin mainly arrived after the 1948 and 1967 exoduses. In Arabic, they are called \u2018East Jordanians\u2019 (\u0634\u0631\u0642 \u0623\u0631\u062f\u0646\u064a\u064a\u0646 ). \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>
  4. During the 2007 municipal and legislative elections, the political opposition spoke out against election fraud. See for instance the interview with former president of Parliament Abdal-Latif Arabiyat (1990-1993), also a member of the Islamic Action Front. \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>
  5. See the report by the Foundation for Strategic Research (2017), \u2018The Muslim Brotherhood Movement: from Pillar of Monarchy to Enemy of the State<\/a>\u2019 \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>
  6. The party finally decided to run for elections. \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>
  7. Founded in 2004, first private daily newspaper in Jordan. It is considered as the main paper that is relatively critical of political authorities, especially after various investigations on social issues. Their criticism is tolerated and integrated to the political system, as was illustrated by the recent appointment of former editor-in-chief Jumana Ghuneimat as Minister for Media Affairs and government spokesperson in 2018. \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>
  8. Before every election, tribes and clans hold \u2018internal consultations\u2019 in order to choose the candidate that will represent them. Naturally, they do not always reach a consensus, so several members of a tribe may run concurrently. \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li><\/ol>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

    Order, reform, and stability: such might be the byword of the Hashemite monarchy, which seemingly weathered the Arab Spring with no incidents of violence. The government managed to skillfully showcase a gradual \u2018democratization\u2019 of the system in response to popular demand for political change.  However, the severe crackdown on the opposition throughout 2020 shed light […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":107,"featured_media":21752,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_molongui_author":["user-107"],"footnotes":"[{\"content\":\"While protesters in Egypt and Tunisia asked for the fall of the regime, demonstrators in Jordan wanted to reform<\/em> it (\u0627\u0644\u0625\u0635\u0644\u0627\u062d).\",\"id\":\"17033121-8644-4195-976d-6fedcc7e51ca\"},{\"content\":\"The number of victims is disputed, especially because the Palestinian \u2018issue\u2019 is a very sensitive one in Jordan at the moment. The lower estimates establish the death toll at 3\u00a0500.\",\"id\":\"305886a9-b554-467f-905c-17c80c5e4178\"},{\"content\":\"The term \u2018Transjordanians\u2019 refers to Jordanians whose families lived on the territory before 1948, whereas the Jordanians of Palestinian origin mainly arrived after the 1948 and 1967 exoduses. In Arabic, they are called \u2018East Jordanians\u2019 (\u0634\u0631\u0642 \u0623\u0631\u062f\u0646\u064a\u064a\u0646 ).\",\"id\":\"2feaae38-4ba1-42e7-8b06-cff42d40efaa\"},{\"content\":\"During the 2007 municipal and legislative elections, the political opposition spoke out against election fraud. See for instance the interview with former president of Parliament Abdal-Latif Arabiyat (1990-1993), also a member of the Islamic Action Front.\",\"id\":\"efcf1c56-6eb9-4d8d-a30e-a5fe8a2960c1\"},{\"content\":\"See the report by the Foundation for Strategic Research (2017), \u2018The Muslim Brotherhood Movement: from Pillar of Monarchy to Enemy of the State<\/a>\u2019\",\"id\":\"9fe5aadf-0bb7-424a-b730-9a408ec5b90a\"},{\"content\":\"The party finally decided to run for elections. \",\"id\":\"bf8ba712-bff0-45ce-a1c5-9ad6359e5e52\"},{\"content\":\"Founded in 2004, first private daily newspaper in Jordan. It is considered as the main paper that is relatively critical of political authorities, especially after various investigations on social issues. Their criticism is tolerated and integrated to the political system, as was illustrated by the recent appointment of former editor-in-chief Jumana Ghuneimat as Minister for Media Affairs and government spokesperson in 2018.\",\"id\":\"19a3450e-89fd-4384-a4f0-238a005f4bf3\"},{\"content\":\"Before every election, tribes and clans hold \u2018internal consultations\u2019 in order to choose the candidate that will represent them. Naturally, they do not always reach a consensus, so several members of a tribe may run concurrently.\",\"id\":\"a40caa1c-e467-4258-a463-5d3ddee51c27\"}]"},"categories":[1],"tags":[78],"podcast":[],"project":[11],"region":[25],"class_list":["post-50","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-article","tag-middle-east-north-africa","project-european-policy-in-jordan","region-middle-east"],"yoast_head":"\nWhen repression leaves the shadows in Jordan - Middle East & North Africa<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"In Jordan, the severe crackdown on the opposition throughout 2020 shed light on a coercive system, the functioning of which was long invisibilized.\" \/>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/noria-research.com\/mena\/when-repression-leaves-the-shadows-in-jordan\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"When repression leaves the shadows in Jordan\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"In Jordan, the severe crackdown on the opposition throughout 2020 shed light on a coercive system, the functioning of which was long invisibilized.\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/noria-research.com\/mena\/when-repression-leaves-the-shadows-in-jordan\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Middle East & North Africa\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/Noriaresearch\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2020-12-07T23:30:42+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2026-03-03T10:29:46+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/noria-research.com\/mena\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/12\/jordanie-illu.jpg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Camille Abescat\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:title\" content=\"When repression leaves the shadows in Jordan\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:description\" content=\"In Jordan, the severe crackdown on the opposition throughout 2020 shed light on a coercive system, the functioning of which was long invisibilized.\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@noria_research\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@noria_research\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Camille Abescat\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"1 minute\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\/\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/noria-research.com\/mena\/when-repression-leaves-the-shadows-in-jordan\/#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/noria-research.com\/mena\/when-repression-leaves-the-shadows-in-jordan\/\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Camille Abescat\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/noria-research.com\/mena\/#\/schema\/person\/e7d67b97162b22765f66b967ff1c33c9\"},\"headline\":\"When repression leaves the shadows in Jordan\",\"datePublished\":\"2020-12-07T23:30:42+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2026-03-03T10:29:46+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/noria-research.com\/mena\/when-repression-leaves-the-shadows-in-jordan\/\"},\"wordCount\":5561,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/noria-research.com\/mena\/#organization\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/noria-research.com\/mena\/when-repression-leaves-the-shadows-in-jordan\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\/\/noria-research.com\/mena\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/12\/jordanie-illu.jpg\",\"keywords\":[\"Middle East & North Africa\"],\"articleSection\":[\"Article\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/noria-research.com\/mena\/when-repression-leaves-the-shadows-in-jordan\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/noria-research.com\/mena\/when-repression-leaves-the-shadows-in-jordan\/\",\"name\":\"When repression leaves the shadows in Jordan - 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