{"id":132,"date":"2022-11-15T14:02:42","date_gmt":"2022-11-15T14:02:42","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/noria-research.com\/?p=29567"},"modified":"2023-12-14T14:43:15","modified_gmt":"2023-12-14T13:43:15","slug":"libyas-electorial-impasse","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/noria-research.com\/mena\/libyas-electorial-impasse\/","title":{"rendered":"Libya’s Electoral Impasse"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n
\u062a\u062d\u0645\u064a\u0644 \u0627\u0644\u0645\u0644\u062e\u0635 \u0627\u0644\u062a\u0646\u0641\u064a\u0630\u064a<\/a><\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n
Download the Executive Summary & Main Findings<\/a><\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n
Download the full report<\/a><\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n
<\/div>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Executive Summary<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

In 2021, Libya\u2019s U.N.-backed election plans collapsed due to technical difficulties, yes, but also politically-motivated maneuvering. Powerful players both within and outside the country moved to subvert and weaken the electoral process. At the top of the list of the Libyan actors implicated in these outcomes is Speaker of the House of Representatives Aqila Saleh. Saleh\u2019s negative interventions\u2014which received active diplomatic support from Egypt and France\u2014ran counter to the spirit of the U.N. roadmap and inspired confusion and animus within the political field.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On the other side of the political divide, Libyan politicians backed by Turkey \u2014 interim Prime Minister Dabaiba and, separately, HSC president Khaled al-Meshri \u2014 contributed to hurting the electoral process, too. Dabaiba, who had earlier promised U.N. officials that he would not run for president, reneged on his pledges. In addition to flouting U.N. rules, he also violated aspects of Saleh\u2019s electoral law. The sitting Prime Minister\u2019 behavior added much to the atmosphere of distrust that ended up compromising the electoral process. As for Meshri: he promoted the holding of a constitutional referendum instead of working on ways to make the elections materialize within the agreed-upon U.N. roadmap.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

These schemes unfolded at a time when the U.N.\u2019s own capacity as mediator and facilitator on Libyan affairs showed exceptional vulnerability. Indeed, crucial mistakes committed by the organization are certainly responsible for 2021\u2019s election failures as well.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Beyond the shortcomings of incumbent Libyan officials and the U.N.\u2019s lapses, the 2021 experiment also revealed the extreme political fear that Saif al-Islam Qadhafi, the late autocrat\u2019s son, inspires amongst the country\u2019s post-2011 elites. The presidential ambitions of Saif al-Islam, despite his weakness on the ground, divide not only Libyans but also foreign states. Russia, which is militarily present in Libya, wishes to see Saif run for president, while Washington doesn\u2019t. This obstacle may potentially reappear in future attempts at elections even if the other issues are addressed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Key Findings<\/h2>\n\n\n\n