{"id":96,"date":"2020-01-28T18:00:52","date_gmt":"2020-01-28T17:00:52","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.noria-research.com\/?p=18231"},"modified":"2024-06-28T15:48:50","modified_gmt":"2024-06-28T13:48:50","slug":"the-local-roots-of-violence-burkina-faso","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/noria-research.com\/africas\/the-local-roots-of-violence-burkina-faso\/","title":{"rendered":"The Local Roots of Violence in Eastern Burkina Faso: Competition over resources, weapons and the State"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
<\/div>\n\n\n\n

Since the end of 2018, an explosion of violence tied to the presence of jihadist groups has shaken Eastern Burkina Faso, an area of the country that had until then remained relatively spared such violence. These militias\u2019 success in taking root locally is largely explained by their ability to latch onto the political and economic marginalization of Eastern Burkina Faso in order to build up an armed insurrection. Eastern Burkina Faso has endured a history of violence, and the area\u2019s citizens feel abandoned by the central state, generating conflictual relations between them. The local population faces endemic criminality and ferocious competition for access to natural resources. The state is felt to be either absent or predatory, and its judicial system ineffective. Local armed groups benefit less from active adhesion to their jihadi ideology, than from these local conditions that enable them to settle. Eastern Burkina Faso therefore can be seen as a magnifying glass for the current dynamics of regionalization of violence in the Sahel.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/em>Transnational Jihad and Local Violence<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Since the end of 2018, like much of the rest of Burkina Faso, the country\u2019s East has witnessed a spectacular increase in the rate of violence committed by jihadist armed groups1<\/a><\/sup>. Such violence has become almost daily, involving the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and attacks on the regular army, kidnapping, and targeted assassinations. Despite several military operations against these armed groups in the region, Eastern Burkina Faso came to prominence in the media coverage of jihad in the Sahel only after Western hostages were freed there in May 20192<\/a><\/sup>, then in November 2019, in the wake of a fatal attack against a bus transporting the employees of a Canadian mining company3<\/a><\/sup>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\nEastern\nBurkina Faso is dubbed \u201cthe red zone\u201d by the Burkinab\u00e9, given\nthe high level of criminal activity in a region that has long\nwitnessed diffuse violence. Its porous borders with neighboring\ncountries have historically made the region a smuggling hub, where\ninformal networks play a crucial role in the local economy and\nprovide a livelihood for many of its inhabitants. Eastern Burkina\nFaso therefore serves as an interface between the Sahel and the\ncoasts of Benin, Ghana and Togo. Cigarettes, fuel, ivory, weapons,\ndrugs and simple everyday goods circulate outside of any state\ncontrol.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

“The Burkinab\u00e9 central state has long refused to recognize the endogenous dimension of the armed insurrection”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

The region is characterized by the socio-economic marginalization of some of its communities and of the younger generation. Such marginalization is especially fostered by increased competition for access to land and natural resources. Jihadists have exploited feelings of dispossession on the part of these cadets sociaux<\/em> (\u201csocial little brothers\u201d)4<\/a><\/sup>. Armed groups offer to help them by proferring advantages and protection\u2014on condition that these cadets sociaux<\/em> join them in opposing the central state that is deemed responsible for their marginalization.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Burkinab\u00e9 state has long refused to recognize the endogenous dimension of the armed insurrection in the East of the country, and pointed the finger at outside players for provoking it\u2014whether those accused are certain players in the conflict in Mali, or mercenaries loyal to Blaise Compaor\u00e9, head of the former regime5<\/a><\/sup>. Such an approach appears to ignore the fact that jihadist armed groups in the region rely more on their ability to exploit local socio-political issues than they do on any outside help. Their ability to conduct guerrilla warfare with ease also largely relies on the prior success of their taking root in areas abandoned by the state and subjected to failed political management.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\nIn\nthis sense, the long-term settlement of jihadist groups in the region\nis less evidence of a political or religious “radicalization”\nof the local population\u2014understood as growing recourse to violent\npractices based on their adhering to an ideological system\u2014than it\nreveals jihadists\u2019 ability to exploit tensions between the central\nstate and populations in the East. Jihadists become embedded locally\nby exploiting a situation whereby the use of violence\u2014or the threat\nof its exercise\u2014is the primary political resource available to the\nlocal population in their relationship with the institutions that\ngovern them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\nFrom\nPressure Over Land-Use to Competition for Natural Resources: <\/strong>\nA political economy that produces violence<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Eastern Burkina Faso enjoys diverse and abundant natural resources: grazing, fertile land, cattle, lakes, etc. Nonetheless, its population has only very poor access to water and electricity. For the most part, locals remain very poor, and with very low levels of formal education. Only 10% of heads of families have received education beyond the primary-school level\u2014and over 60% have never attended school, in a region where over half of households suffer from food insecurity6<\/a><\/sup>. The region also suffers from lack of public investment: its roads are in a disastrous state, and its few administrative buildings are dilapidated and underequipped.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\nBurkina\nFaso inherited a Jacobin centralized-state tradition from the\ncolonial period. Peripheral regions feel marginalized by the central\nstate in Ouagadougou. Many of the East\u2019s inhabitants associate the\ncentral state with the Mossi community that constitutes a majority in\nBurkina Faso, and is primarily found in the country\u2019s central\nplateau. The other components of the population\u2014Gourmantch\u00e9 and\nPeul\u2014feel deprived of access to political and economic resources,\nand develop identity politics in opposition to the central state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

“Pressure on land-use explains agricultural activity moving towards transhumance areas and provoking tensions between peasants and livestock farmers”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Three primary dynamics govern transformation in relationships to land-use and developing economic inequality in Eastern Burkina Faso. The first of these relates to Law 0034, that came into effect in 2009. The law modified the rules governing land-property sales, by introducing capitalist frameworks\u2014selling to the highest bidder\u2014at the expense of practices of transmission through the family. This led to a process of concentration of landownership that was relatively new in the area. In a context of demographic growth7<\/a><\/sup>, often very aged landowners thereby deprive the younger generations of the possibility of using land for agriculture. As the mayor of a small town explained: \u201cIn my area there was an old man with around ten children. He sold nearly all his lands to a wealthy inhabitant of Ouagadougou. He\u2019d never had any money\u2014and suddenly he was offered millions of Francs. Obviously, he caved in. But what will his children live on now?\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The result of this process has been hostility from the younger generation towards the new landowners. These are often perceived as \u201cforeigners\u201d because they are not drawn from local family or community circles, and are accused of dispossessing the locals. This hostility sometimes extends to local traditional chieftains, who are denounced as complicit with this process. This generational divide deprives the younger generations of the ability to engage in agricultural activity, and encourages the emergence of a landowner class that is often deemed to be close to the central state. Pressure on land-use brought about by the restriction on available land then explains agricultural activity moving towards transhumance areas. In turn, this provokes tensions between peasants and livestock farmers, in a country where these two activities each play a key role. Agriculture and livestock-farming provide employment for over 80% of the working population.8<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\nSince\nthe 2000s especially, a second dynamic has transformed the\nrelationship to land-use locally. This is tied to the central\nadministration reinforcing protected natural areas and regulated\nhunting areas, thereby reducing the ability of locals to reach arable\nland and fishing and hunting areas. Social frustration is all the\ngreater that, once again, these privatized zones are generally\nmonopolized by groups and individuals who are labelled by locals as\nbeing \u201cforeigners\u201d. The central state, in the shape of Forestry\nand Water Commission officials, may also extort locals, as described\nby a representative of the livestock-farmers community: \u201cShepherds\ncall us because state officials demand 100,000 Francs from them for a\nfew branches cut down in a park. Can you imagine what such a sum\nrepresents for them?\u201d These frustrations are also nurtured by the\npresence of foreign companies. Especially since 2017, in the Pendjari\npark on the border with Benin, private security guards, employed by\nthe NGO African Parks, have pushed some locals out of protected\nzones. These land-use policies lead to reducing the food-producing\nareas available to the rural population, that fails to benefit from\nthe reallocation of land.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\nFinally,\nlike in the rest of the country, the foreign companies that exploit\nthe gold mines have set up strict security perimeters around the\nareas where they are active. Locals (including security) cannot enter\nsuch areas. They feel they do not enjoy sufficient compensation for\nwhat they perceive as a process of land-confiscation to the benefit\nof gold-mining activities. This feeling is also intensified by the\ncriminalization of traditional gold-panning activities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

“The central state has to date provided only an exclusively security-based response to the development of the informal economy and the social mobilizations in the East”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

\nIn\nthe face of limited prospects for legal economic activity, the\nyounger generations enter the informal sectors of the local economy:\ngold-panning, poaching and various kinds of smuggling. The State\u2019s\nonly response to date has been to criminalize these activities.\nAround 20 illegal gold-panning sites in Eastern Burkina Faso attract\ninactive youth\u2014but these activities remain threatened by state\nofficials, who can shut them down at any moment, or extort workers as\nthey leave extraction sites. As for those who choose to occupy land\nin protected zones to cultivate it illegally, they are expelled\u2014often\nviolently\u2014by state officials (police, military, Forestry and Water\nCommission officials), who destroy their huts and grain silos, and\nimpose fines.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\nThe\nconflicts generated by these rarefied economic prospects are all the\nmore significant because they are generally poorly regulated by the\nstate, whose judicial system is considered incompetent and corrupt.\nAs a livestock-farmer explains: \u201cIf we go to court, it\u2019s\ngenerally the wealthier party that wins.\u201d Locals in the East\nperceive state officials in the region as threats to the social\npeace, and express their lack of confidence in the various judicial\ninstitutions (police, gendarmes, the courts)\u2014as well as suspicions\nthat security forces and criminals work hand-in-hand.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\nLocal\ncommunities that resist state authority therefore attempt to invent\nlocal management methods to circumvent the power of state officials.\nFaced with unprecedented forms of mobilization in response to the\neconomic marginalization of a growing part of the local population,\nthe central state has to date provided only an exclusively\nsecurity-based response, such as developing military \u201ccombing\u201d\noperations that have often led to abuses being committed against\nlocals. These policies nurture dynamics of social fragmentation, both\nwithin the region itself and down to the family level, prompting a\nmultitude of individual and collective frustrations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\nThese\ndevelopments in land-use practices have deeply shaken the local\npopulation\u2019s relationship to the land, and increased their\nresentment. Property-rights and land-use not only condition the\nproperty relation between people and their land. They also determine\nthe relations between individuals. Jihadi armed groups taking root in\nthe region therefore acts as a revealing indicator of these issues,\nthat are also found in other areas of Burkina Faso (including in the\ncountry\u2019s West) as well as at the regional level.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\nTaking\nUp Arms<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

For around two decades, the transformation of means of access to land and natural resources in the region has been intertwined with the spread of various kinds of armed violence. In the 2000s, criminal groups specialized in cutting off roads and taxing the locals, exploiting the area\u2019s dense forests, porous borders, and the absence of state control in part of its Western region. Since 2015, \u201cKoglweogo\u201d self-defense groups have dismantled many criminal networks, seeming to calm the situation somewhat9<\/a><\/sup>. Some criminals opted\u2014willingly and otherwise\u2014to integrate the self-defense groups, automatically lowering criminality rates. In 2017, a Koglweogo leader explained that “We managed to bring back our children who had left for the bush to kill, to steal and to rape. They are now back among us.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\nThe\nsearch for social peace in the region has favored an alliance of\nconvenience between the absentee state and its Koglweogo partners.\nThe reduction in criminal activity has, however, gone together with\nan explosion in abuses of power by the self-defense groups: arbitrary\narrests and detention, extortion through imposing arbitrary fines,\ntorture, etc. State security forces periodically take part in the\nself-defense groups\u2019 activities, but this alliance has gradually\neroded the central state\u2019s legitimacy, both to deploy itself on the\nground\u2014and to use force.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

“The self-defense groups have not been able to face down competition from better-armed and better-trained groups”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

At first, collaboration between the state and the self-defense groups enabled creating a regulated space for the private use of violence, since the Koglweogo do not represent a direct threat to the state. They did not attack state institutions, and regularly cooperated with its security forces, despite some friction on the ground. But the security solution has struggled to paper over the consequences of an absentee state. As an elected official put it in 2017, “Before the Koglweogo, there was no security. Now security has improved\u2014but out here, one can drive for hours without ever coming cross a police station (\u2026) and look at the state of our roads! Nothing has changed, the state does nothing for us.\u201d The state encourages the formation of this mosaic of vigilante groups, that swiftly acquire official or quasi-official status with respect to administering justice, securing property, etc.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

While the self-defense groups have somewhat contributed to stabilizing the area, they have not been able to face down competition from better-armed and better-trained groups settling there, in a context in which the state itself was unable to respond to the incursions of the jihadi groups. From 2018 on, attacks proliferated in the region, leaving the self-defense groups impotent. \u201cTwo of our members had their throats slit during a joint operation with the army. We can\u2019t fight; our weapons aren\u2019t suitable for warfare,\u201d a Koglweogo official complains.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\nSuch\nevents have largely demobilized the Koglweogo in the area, or incited\nthem to enter into local non-aggression agreements with the\njihadists. The mayor of an Eastern town explains that \u201cthe\njihadists came to see the Koglweogo and told them that they were\ndoing the same work helping the local population, and had no quarrel\nwith each other so long as they did not assist the state\u201d. Former\nKoglweogo appear to have joined the jihadist groups, or to\ncollaborate with them on a regular basis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\nWhether\nthrough banditry or joining self-defense or jihadist groups, taking\nup arms has become widespread and banal in the region. Movement\nbetween these various groups relies on opportunism based on family\nnetworks, friendship relations, and new trading networks opening up.\nThe porous boundaries between these groups demonstrate that, in a\ndisastrous social and economic context, exercising and controlling\nviolence is above all a political resource. In turn, those who join\nthese groups acquire skills and a social network that take part in a\nrestructuring of local society, in a context in which violence\nbecomes the primary political resource. The upward social mobility of\nthose who bear arms also makes any return to the previous status quo\ndifficult.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

“An individual can perfectly well combine trafficking activities, agricultural work, and active participation in a jihadist group”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

\nThe\nemergence of a generation that resorts to bearing weapons responds to\na governance-through-violence of the region by a multitude of\nplayers. The state, castigated for its absenteeism and the corruption\nof its officials, is present only through its security forces, held\nresponsible for many abuses against the civilian population. Armed\ngroups, whether these are criminal, self-defense or jihadist, are\nlastingly settled institutions in the East. Their primary mode of\ninteraction with the population, however, remains similar:\ncoercion\u2014or threat.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\nIn\na context of instability and insecurity, these carriers of violence\nbecome more important local players than are state officials. Lack of\nprospects for the younger generations in particular pushes many of\nthem to combine bearing weapons with roles in a \u201chustling\u201d\neconomy. Many of them bear weapons as a \u201cseasonal\u201d job; an\nindividual can perfectly well combine trafficking activities,\nagricultural work, and active participation in a jihadist group.\nAdding to this mix are youth who emigrated for economic reasons and\nfound themselves in conflict areas in Mali and Niger. Some of them\njoined armed groups before returning to their birthplace. Against a\nbackground of weapons-proliferation and activities based on bearing\nthose weapons, social mobility and fluid identities make grasping the\nemergence of jihadism in East Burkina Faso especially complex.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\nThe\nnovelty of the emergence of jihadism in the region is not its\nrecourse to weapons. By directly taking on the state and its symbols,\nhowever, it offers a break with the prevalent social ordering of\nviolence, that was previously limited to controlling criminal\nactivities and the territory, sometimes in concert with state\nauthorities. This convergence between the jihadist uses of violence\nand the demands of part of the local population that feels\nmarginalized by the central state is what best enables grasping how\njihadism has taken root in Burkina Faso.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cThose who kill us are our sons and brothers\u201d: How jihadist armed groups took root<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

\nVarious\nmilitary \u201dcombing\u201d operations led by the armies of Mali, Burkina\nFaso, Niger and France have pushed certain jihadi armed groups to\nleave the Sahel strip and take refuge in areas subjected to less\nmilitary pressure. With its hard-to-access great forests, Eastern\nBurkina Faso is a strategic sanctuary for these fighters.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

“The armed groups concentrated on pushing out the symbols of state presence”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

\nFrom\nearly 2018 on, the presence of insurgent groups went together with\nguerrilla operations to harass security forces, targeting patrols or\nisolated security posts. These tactics forced the military and police\nto barricade themselves, only rarely leaving their encampments.\nAccording to a local security official, \u201cThe military no longer\ndare to mount patrols in the bush or the forests: they are too afraid\nof stepping on mines. At night, one customs post is even staffed by\nKoglweogo because the military refuse to staff it\u201d. From this\ninitial period of their presence in the area, the armed groups have\nkept the habit of sustaining ambiguity around their identity, and do\nnot lay claim to their own attacks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\nOnce\nthey had made the security forces retreat far from the rural\nenvironment, the armed groups then concentrated on pushing out the\nsymbols of state presence, by threatening Water and Forestry\nCommission officials, teachers and local municipalities. As an\nelected official describes it: \u201cthey come to the mosques at the end\nof prayer to give us orders; they threaten the schoolteachers; we see\nthem doing rounds on motorbikes with their Kalashnikovs; people are\nafraid.\u201d These strategies have prompted some local state officials\nto flee: administrators of local authorities, teachers and health\npersonnel. They have also led many schools to close, increasing the\nlocal population\u2019s feelings of being abandoned.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\nThe\njihadists\u2019 takeover of opposition to the state, and their embedding\nthemselves socially, have enabled them to recruit fighters locally.\nThese groups thus include members from every community in the area\n(Peul, Gourmantche and Mossi), as well as some foreigners from\nneighboring countries. Thanks to these local recruitment\npractices\u2014that include integrating some bandits and former\nKoglweogo, as well as pacts of mutual non-agression reached with the\nlatter\u2014 these groups have also developed a fine-grained\nunderstanding of the local population within which they live. This is\na crucial asset for conducting attacks on security forces and\ntargeted assassinations against civilians opposed to their presence,\nor those suspected of colluding with the state. \u201cThose who kill us\nare our sons and our brothers. Everyone is afraid. Those who\ncollaborate with the state have their throats slit; they threaten us\ndirectly. I can\u2019t even go back to my village,\u201d says a mayor from\nthe East who is now a refugee in Fada N\u2019Gourma.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The makeup of these armed groups underscores how they have adapted to local conditions. In the Pama region on the border with Benin, for instance, one finds young Burkinab\u00e9 immigrants, who returned from Mali or Niger bearing stringent religious practices close to Ansar ul Islam and the Macina Liberation Front10<\/a><\/sup>. Cattle breeders\u2014transhumant communities who roam the northern Soum region\u2014provide a second group of fighters. Their rapprochement with the jihadi groups has been eased by the reduction in pastureland, and their coming into conflict with state authorities and the sedentary communities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

“The jihadists\u2019 first moves were to reopen hunting and fishing areas to locals”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

\nIn\nthe Gayeri area, close to Niger, armed groups are purportedly\naffiliated to the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), made up\nof locals and foreigners who also fought in Mali. This group has been\nthe most offensive strategically, proselytizing in villages and\nburning public schools. It has also provided protection to Peul\ntranshumant communities that are targeted by reprisals from Burkinab\u00e9\nsecurity forces, who, in turn, accuse them of supporting the\njihadists.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\nLocal\narmed groups have thus skillfully grasped hold of local demands and\nspecificities to settle themselves in the area. To gain the approval\nof local populations in the East, the jihadists\u2019 first moves were\nto reopen hunting and fishing areas to locals. The armed groups\noffered protection to locals threatened by the state for their\ninformal economic activities, whether gold-panning, poaching or\ntrans-border trafficking. They latched on to the economic fabric and\nlevied taxes enabling them to provide themselves with weapons,\nammunition and food, by promising to keep state officials away\n(policemen, the army, customs officers and Forestry and Water\nCommission officials). Similarly, they protect local communities from\nthe predatory practices of such officials, as in the case of\nconflicts between livestock-farmers and Forestry and Water Commission\nofficials accused of abuses against them. These officials were among\nthose targeted by the first waves of assassinations, that preceded\nmore ambitious attacks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\nIn\na gold-panning area, the mayor of a village close to the border with\nBenin recalls that the jihadists \u201cmade a deal with the\ngold-panners, who were in conflict with the gendarmes and the\nForestry and Water Commission officials who had come to expel or\nextort them. Now, they control the gold-panning sites and levy taxes\non production, and the authorities don\u2019t dare to come close any\nmore.\u201d Control of gold-panning sites appears to have become an\nespecially lucrative activity for these fighters, and this burgeoning\nproduction is easily sold on through the coastal countries (Benin,\nbut especially Togo). The revenue of gold-panning taxes enable buying\nup weapons in the neighboring countries to the South, by exploiting\npreexisting smuggling networks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

\nJoining\nan armed group is therefore perceived as a factor of upward mobility\nfor undervalued youth. The prestige tied to bearing arms, the\nsymbolic means of retribution that those bearing arms gain access to,\nand the ability to find a meaningful ideological framework: all\nbecome accessible resources to them in this context. As a local\nelected official concedes, \u201cI see the idle youth in my village\nwatching propaganda videos on their phones. They want something more\nout of life.\u201d Since the armed groups pay their fighters, upward\nmobility is combined with enhanced material conditions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\nConclusion<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

\nThe\ninitial responses to local violence by the Burkinab\u00e9 state failed to\ncurb its spread and the activity of jihadist groups. Nor do they\nappear to have restored confidence among local populations, that fear\nthe army\u2019s abuses no less than they do those perpetrated by the\njihadists. The competition in the exercise of violence demonstrates\nthat a military response alone will be unable to bring about an even\nrelative appeasement of local tensions. Nor can it check the dynamics\nwhereby jihadi groups have become settled in the region, grafting\nthemselves onto a critical socio-economic situation and a local\nhistory of violence. Faced with this developing insurrectional\ncontext, and within an alarming regional security dynamic, the\nBurkinab\u00e9 state appears to have chosen a military-first solution in\nthe East\u2014if not a military-only one. While military \u201ccombing\u201d\noperations have enabled \u201cneutralizing\u201d some fighters, they cannot\nprovide a long-term solution.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\nThe\nemergence of a religious political register linked to jihad therefore\nneeds to be contextualized within the local dynamics that govern it.\nArmed groups have proved able to insert themselves within the\neconomic and social fabric of the region, taking advantage of\nfavorable circumstances and geography. The roots of armed opposition\nto the state, and of the attraction of these groups, are above all to\nbe found in the abandonment, dispossession and marginalization felt\nby the local population. Locals are confronted with an economic\nstruggle for natural resources in which they feel disadvantaged by\nforeign forces, embodied by the large mining companies, the private\nnatural parks, state officials, and internal immigration.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Finally, the situation in Eastern Burkina Faso is symptomatic of Sahel-wide dynamics of state recomposition, where state institutions increasingly appear confined to urban and suburban zones. Faced with rising violence, state administration, local elected bodies, security forces and state services withdraw to capitals and medium-sized cities (in this case, Ouagadougou and Fada N\u2019Gourma). Once past the security positions at the edge of these areas, rural areas have become inaccessible or governed through violence, whether this is exercised by groups the state can use as proxies\u2014or by other groups fighting the state itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Notes<\/h2>\n\n\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Since the end of 2018, an explosion of violence tied to the presence of jihadist groups has shaken Eastern Burkina Faso, an area of the country that had until then remained relatively spared such violence. These militias\u2019 success in taking root locally is largely explained by their ability to latch onto the political and economic […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":66,"featured_media":22077,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_molongui_author":["user-66"],"footnotes":"[{\"content\":\"According to the UN, such violence has killed over 700 since the beginning of 2015, and has produced around 500,000 internally displaced and refugees.\",\"id\":\"noria-1660\"},{\"content\":\"Overnight on 9-10 May 2019, French Special Forces freed four hostages (two French citizens, a South Korean and an American) who had been kidnapped in Benin and detained in Burkina Faso. Two French soldiers were killed in the operation.\",\"id\":\"noria-2211\"},{\"content\":\"On 6 November 2019, an ambush targeted the personnel of entrepreneurs and suppliers of the Boungou gold mine, operated by Semafo, a Canadian company. The attack left 37 dead and 60 injured.\",\"id\":\"noria-2581\"},{\"content\":\"Cadets sociaux<\/em> are those whose social characteristics (e.g. age or community) limit their access to institutionalized economic networks, often blocking their social mobility and excluding them from access to positions of power.\",\"id\":\"noria-4103\"},{\"content\":\"Compaor\u00e9, the former President of Burkina Faso, has been in exile in Ivory Coast since 2014. He is regularly accused of destabilizing Burkina Faso by exploiting former soldiers loyal to him.\",\"id\":\"noria-4947\"},{\"content\":\"Minist\u00e8re de l\u2019Agriculture et des Am\u00e9nagements Hydro-agricoles, \"Projet de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 alimentaire \u00e0 l\u2019Est du Burkina Faso\", 2019.\",\"id\":\"noria-6941\"},{\"content\":\"Pressure over land-use is increased by rising demography. According to the UN, 45% of Burkinabes were under 15 in 2012. The National Institute for Statistics and Demography predicts that the region\u2019s population will rise from 1.6 million in 2014 to 2.6 million in 2030.\",\"id\":\"noria-9084\"},{\"content\":\"Minist\u00e8re de l\u2019Agriculture et des Am\u00e9nagements Agricoles, \u201c\u00c9tablissement de la situation de r\u00e9f\u00e9rence du projet de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 alimentaire \u00e0 l\u2019Est du Burkina Faso\u201d, 2012.\",\"id\":\"noria-10812\"},{\"content\":\"See our article<\/a> on the Koglweogo movement.\",\"id\":\"noria-16521\"},{\"content\":\"Ansar ul Islam and the Macina Liberation Front are jihadist movements tied to Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). They are active both in Mali and in Burkina Faso.\",\"id\":\"noria-27363\"}]"},"categories":[1],"tags":[18,19],"podcast":[],"project":[],"region":[74],"class_list":["post-96","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-article","tag-burkina-faso","tag-conflict","region-africa"],"yoast_head":"\nThe Local Roots of Violence in Eastern Burkina Faso: Competition over resources, weapons and the State - Africas<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/noria-research.com\/africas\/the-local-roots-of-violence-burkina-faso\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"The Local Roots of Violence in Eastern Burkina Faso\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Since the end of 2018, an explosion of violence tied to the presence of jihadist groups has shaken Eastern Burkina Faso, an area of the country that had until then remained relatively spared such violence.\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/noria-research.com\/africas\/the-local-roots-of-violence-burkina-faso\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Africas\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2020-01-28T17:00:52+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2024-06-28T13:48:50+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/noria-research.com\/africas\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/01\/Photo-femme-re\u0301fugie\u0301e-1-scaled.jpg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Tanguy Quidelleur\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:title\" content=\"The Local Roots of Violence in Eastern Burkina Faso\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:description\" content=\"Since the end of 2018, an explosion of violence tied to the presence of jihadist groups has shaken Eastern Burkina Faso, an area of the country that had until then remained relatively spared such violence.\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Tanguy Quidelleur\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"19 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\/\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/noria-research.com\/africas\/the-local-roots-of-violence-burkina-faso\/#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/noria-research.com\/africas\/the-local-roots-of-violence-burkina-faso\/\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Tanguy Quidelleur\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/noria-research.com\/africas\/#\/schema\/person\/6d52e1f3f028bff2e8d70dd89b9ed6e5\"},\"headline\":\"The Local Roots of Violence in Eastern Burkina Faso: Competition over resources, weapons and the State\",\"datePublished\":\"2020-01-28T17:00:52+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2024-06-28T13:48:50+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/noria-research.com\/africas\/the-local-roots-of-violence-burkina-faso\/\"},\"wordCount\":4215,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/noria-research.com\/africas\/#organization\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/noria-research.com\/africas\/the-local-roots-of-violence-burkina-faso\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\/\/noria-research.com\/africas\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/01\/Photo-femme-re\u0301fugie\u0301e-1-scaled.jpg\",\"keywords\":[\"Burkina Faso\",\"Conflict\"],\"articleSection\":[\"Article\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/noria-research.com\/africas\/the-local-roots-of-violence-burkina-faso\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/noria-research.com\/africas\/the-local-roots-of-violence-burkina-faso\/\",\"name\":\"The Local Roots of Violence in Eastern Burkina Faso: Competition over resources, weapons and the State - 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